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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF REORGANIZATION: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF LOUISIANA'S
HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES
May, 1979
Mary Karen O'Brien, B.A., University of New Orleans
M.A., Louisiana State University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Lewis C. Mainzer
In 1973, fifty-nine health and welfare agencies
in Louisiana were consolidated under one large umbrella
department. Included in this consolidation were the depart-
ments of health, welfare, and hospitals; two hospitals
which operated independently of the hospital department;
and several boards and commissions. The purpose of this
case study is to determine what effect that reorganization
has had on: 1-the structures of the reorganized agencies,
2-the personnel of those agencies, 3-the decision-making
and management procedures in the new department, H-the
v
outputs (i.e., the policies, programs and services) of the
consolidated department; and 5-the political-administrative
environment in which the department operates. In each
instance, the question that has been asked is: Has reorgan-
ization made any difference?
Based on the findings of this study, it cannot
be said that the Louisiana reorganization was a great
success. It has not saved the state millions of dollars
as its supporters predicted; nor has it resulted in improved
health and welfare services. Nevertheless, the Louisiana
reorganization has had important consequences. It has
given the governor greater leverage in dealing with the
state bureaucracy, and it has also allowed a limited
reassessment of the state's health and welfare policy.
Interestingly, the governor's espousal of reorganization
has gained him support with taxpayers as well as users
of the health-welfare system. The poor and the needy of
the state were gratified by the governor's concern for the
quality of health and welfare services. In addition,
blacks supported the governor's appointment of blacks to
key positions in the department. Those appointments seemed
to symbolize the governor's commitment to greater black
participation in state government.
Thus, while it cannot be said that reorganization
has achieved all that was predicted for it, the fact is
vii
that reorganization has made a difference in Louisiana.
Whether or not the state reorganized its health and welfare
agencies obviously mattered to the governor, the legislators,
clientele, the public, and the providers of the state's
health and welfare services. Because of this, it might be
concluded that the greatest impact of this reorganization
was not in the administrative realm, but in the political
realm.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past seventy years, administrative reor-
ganization has become a major field of interest for stu-
dents of public administration and state government. The
literature is particularly rich in that it contains many
useful case studies showing how reorganization decisions
are made. Those studies include the Inter-University
Case Program (commonly called the ICP series) 1 as well as
the collections by Harold Stein 2 and Frederick Mosher3
(the latter focuses entirely on case studies of adminis-
trative reorganization of state governments).
Most of those studies found that there is a
great deal of politics involved in making reorganization
decisions. Contrary to the rhetoric of the early re-
formers, the question of organization structure is not a
technical matter that political actors are content to
leave in the hands of the professional bureaucrats. The
reason for this lies in the fact that the determination
of organization structure may be important in deciding
which interests will receive greater emphasis in the pol-
itical system. In practical terms, this means that the
choice of organizational structure may affect decisions
on budgets, programs, or personnel. Since reorganization
1
2represents an attempt to change organizational structures/
one can readily understand bureaucratic reluctance to re-
organize. And, as case studies have shown, this bureau-
cratic reluctance can produce reorganization debates which
are protracted and often very bitter.
But what happens after a reorganization plan has
been approved by a legislature? Given the intense struggle
involved in the reorganization process, it is difficult
to believe that all combatants will accept the reorgani-
zation decision as final. It would seem more likely that
they will continue to fight to obtain the organizational
structures which they believe will be most beneficial to
their interests.
A major limitation of much of the existing reor-
ganization literature is that it fails to provide a sys-
tematic analysis of the effects of reorganization. The
authors of the reorganization case studies seem to take
it for granted that the intended effects of a reorganiza-
tion will actually be realized. However, judging from the
findings of a follow up case study by Francis Rourke, this
assumption cannot be made. Rourke ' s study focused on
the attempted reorganization of the federal employment
services. He found that while the reorganization was
successful in achieving a formal change of organizational
structures, it did not alter the established patterns of
interaction between the reorganized agency and its sup-
3porters
.
Thus, Rourke's study suggests that implementing a
reorganization is actually a very dynamic process. Admin-
istrative agencies and their supporters are not likely to
halt their struggle against a reorganization just because
a legislative body has formally approved it. On the
contrary, they will probably continue their struggle
in an attempt to modify or to accommodate the organiza-
tion change. In the long run, it is possible that a
systematic study of the attempt to implement a reorganiza-
tion will reveal additional insights into organizational
behavior
.
The purpose of this study is to provide a follow
up study of the 1973 Louisiana reorganization. The pri-
mary focus will be on ascertaining how the consolidation
of fifty-nine health and welfare agencies under one large
umbrella department has affected the state's administra-
tive system. More specifically, the study will examine
the effect of the 1973 reorganization on: 1-the struc-
tures of the fifty-nine agencies consolidated under the
umbrella department, 2-the personnel of the consolidated
agencies, 3-the decision-making and management procedures
in the new umbrella department, 4 -the outputs (i.e., the
programs, budget, policies, and services) of the umbrella
department, and 5-the political-administrative environment
in which the department operates. In each instance, the
4questions which will be asked are: Has reorganization made
any difference? If so, what?
Data for this study will be gathered from a vari-
ety of sources. These include: newspapers, public docu-
ments, personal observations of the writer, and interviews
with political-administrative actors.
5Notes for Introduction
1. The Inter-University Case Program has been publishing
case studies since 1951. This series includes case
studies of all levels of government; however most of
them seem to focus on the federal level.
2. Harold Stein, ed., Public Administration and Policy
Development: A Case Book (New York: Harcourt , Brace
195? ) . The Stein collection of case studies was
published as part of the ICP series.
3. Frederick C. Mosher, ed., Governmental Reorganization:
Cases and Commentary (New York : Bobbs-Merrill
, 1967 )
•
4. James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch
(New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 195-197.
5. Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administrative
Reorganization: A Case History," Journal of Politics 19
(August, 1957), 461-478.
CHAPTER I
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT
Introduction
When Edwin Edwards took office as Louisiana gov-
ernor in 1972, there was reason for the general public
to be excited. He was the first Cajun Catholic elected
governor in modern times. (He even took his oath of
office in French!) Perhaps even more significant though,
was the promise of an era of reform during the coming
Edwards administration. Louisiana had just gone through
an embarrassing period of political scandals involving
charges of links between the governor's office and organ-
ized crime figures. To make matters worse, these scan-
dals had received national attention through a series of
articles in Life magazine.
During the 1971-72 election campaign, several of
the gubernatorial candidates had offered detailed plans
for reforming state government. These included: admin-
istrative reorganization, constitutional revision, fi-
nancial reform, and revision of the state's laws governing
the conduct of public officials. Shortly after Governor
Edwards took office, he presented his reorganization plan
6
7to the state legislature. Among the areas scheduled for
reorganization was health-welfare. His plan called for
the consolidation of fifty-nine separate health and wel-
fare agencies under one large umbrella department (whose
commissioner would be appointed by the governor).
Edwards predicted that his consolidation plan
would result in better management of the state's health
and welfare services and in a great financial savings for
the state. The latter claim, in particular, received a
great deal of publicity in the media. Supposedly, the
savings would come about through the combination of over-
lapping programs and the elimination of others which were
deemed to be no longer needed. Although most of the
governor's reorganization plan failed to be approved by
the legislature, the health-welfare consolidation was.
Even a cursory glance through the reorganization
literature shows that the recent Louisiana reorganization
was not unique. On the contrary, that reorganization may
best be seen as part of a national reform movement which
had its beginnings in the late nineteenth century. Its
moralistic/reformist tone as well as the promise of econ-
omies and efficiency fit into a general pattern that the
1973 Louisiana reorganization appears to follow. There-
fore, in order to understand more fully the Louisiana re-
organization, it seems appropriate first to reexamine the
general state reorganization movement. Questions which
8must be considered are: How and why did the movement de-
velop? What were its basic objectives? Why did it fail?
And, where is the state reorganization movement heading
in the 1970s? Answers to these questions may give added
insight into the 1973 Louisiana reorganization.
Origins of the Movement
The growth of state government in the nineteenth century .
The roots of the state reorganization movement can be
traced to the late nineteenth century. Because of the
tremendous economic and urban expansion in this country,
there was pressure on state government to assume new func-
tions in the areas of health, education and welfare. In
response to these demands, states enacted health and san-
itary codes, created boards of public health and charity,
and expanded their public education systems. As each new
function was added, a separate agency was created to ad-
minister it. It was not uncommon to find several agencies
operating similar programs. Since these were independent
agencies, they were free to pursue their own policies
regardless of how they conflicted. As a result, it be-
came increasingly difficult to say what state policy was.
This situation worsened as states continued to add new
1functions
.
The heart of the problem lay in the fact that there
was no one in state government with enough power or au-
9thority to coordinate the activities of the administrative
branch. Most people assumed that the governor was the log-
ical choice to play this role. However the legacy of the
states' colonial experience had left a deep-seated mistrust
of the governor which was reflected in most of the state
constitutions adopted in the eighteenth and nineteenth
2
centuries. When the new administrative agencies were
created in the late nineteenth century, they were given
either popularly elected department heads or multi-member
boards over which the governor had very limited power.
Since few governors possessed any significant staff serv-
ices (e.g., budget making authority), the governor had
no effective means to force state agencies to coordinate
their activities.
The state legislatures were even less equipped to
control and coordinate the state bureaucracy. The same
legacy that had led to the creation of a weak executive
system had also led to the creation of a system domin-
ated by the legislative branch. When some legislatures
abused their powers, there was pressure to strip state
legislatures of their excessive powers. In the process,
many states went too far in the other direction. They
enacted constitutional provisions limiting the legisla-
ture to biennial sessions and prohibiting certain legis-
lative actions (for instance, incurring a state debt).
The effect of this governmental fragmentation was to ere-
10
ate a political vacuum in state government. According to
political scientist Allan Richards, this situation begged
for someone who could bring order to the chaos.
Political corruption and the goal of responsible government
.
That someone who filled the vacuum in state government was
the political boss; however his ascent to power was charac-
terized by a degree of political corruption previously un-
known in American government. Historian Richard Hofstadter
says that it was the newspaper and magazine articles of
the Muckrakers which first exposed the widespread nature
of the corruption. Those articles showed large corpora-
tions contributing to the political machines in return for
governmental contracts and other favors which the machines
7
could offer
.
As might be expected, public reaction to the corrup-
tion was swift as civic-minded citizens organized clubs to
promote good government. Although political amateurs, they
managed to elect some reform candidates. However lacking
strong organizational support, those candidates usually
g
lost to machine candidates at the next election. Richard
Hofstadter suggests that beyond the election of "good men"
to office, the reformers were not certain what they wanted
to achieve through political action. He says that the re-
formers often spoke of wanting to:
restore a type of economic individualism and political
democracy that was widely believed to have existed m
America and to have been destroyed by the great corpor-
11
ation and the corrupt political machine; and with that
restoration to bring back a kind of civic purity that
was also believed to have been lost. 9
Typical of the reform measures they proposed were
the direct primary, the recall, and the initiative and ref-
erendum. These were supposed to increase citizen partici-
pation as well as strengthen citizen control over govern-
ment. The record shows that these objectives were never
realized. 10 In the end, the reformers had overestimated
the ability of the average citizen to use such complicated
measures as the initiative and referendum and had under-
estimated the ability of the political bosses to adapt to
changing circumstances. Hofstadter reported that in most
cases the bosses "found ways to deflect or to use the re-
forms that were meant to unseat them."
The drive for economy and efficiency . The creation of the
New York Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906 signaled both
a new direction in the government reform movement and the
beginning of a "science" of administration. The founders
of the research bureaus brought to the government reform
movement a more realistic, pragmatic approach to govern-
mental problems which was not focused just on electing
"good men" to office. According to Jane Dahlberg, this
different focus may in part be attributed to the fact that
the founders of the research bureaus had been trained in
the country's newly organized business schools.
1 3 The
government researchers believed that management tech-
12
niques useful in a large corporation could be adapted for
use in government. They saw the creation of formal research
bureaus as a means of facilitating both the accumulation
of descriptive data about government operations and the
application of the analytical techniques and standards
| hborrowed from their business backgrounds.
One of the concerns which the government research-
ers brought with them to the reform movement was an interest
15in economy and efficiency. In this context, the most im-
portant influence may have been Frederick Taylor's theory
of scientific management. Taylor's studies of the steel
industry convinced him that most business inefficiency
resulted from poor utilization of resources. Taylor
claimed that the solution lay in finding the "one best
way" to organize every work task."^
Taylor's work was enthusiastically embraced by
the government researchers. They reasoned that if Taylor's
assumptions could produce efficiency in industry, then
application of his "one best way" to government would pro-
duce similar results. 17 Therefore, the government re-
searchers began directing their work toward discovering
the best way to organize each government function.
Not everyone agreed with this new direction in the
government reform movement. Many believed that this new
direction was incompatible with the pursuit of government
responsibility because it entailed strengthening the gov-
ernor without assuring an adequate check on that power.
On the other side, the government researchers argued that
government could be made both efficient and responsible.
They contended that the consolidation of executive func-
tions under the governor would not only increase the
likelihood of obtaining efficiency in government, but
would also provide the voters with a readily identifiable
official to hold accountable for the actions of govern-
ment. As the government researchers concluded, this
would be impossible to obtain under a fragmented govern-
mental system. ^°
The standards of state reorganization . Over the span of
ten years, the New York Bureau issued numerous studies
making specific recommendations for improving administra-
tive organization and management in municipal govern-
ments. In 1915, at the request of the New York consti-
tutional convention, the Bureau undertook the first com-
prehensive study of state government. Although its pro-
posals were rejected by the voters, its recommendations on
agency consolidation, the executive budget, and guberna-
torial staffing patterns became the model as one state
20
after another reorganized its administrative structures.
By 1938, twenty-three states had adopted reorganization
plans. Based on those experiences, Arthur E. Buck com-
21
piled a list of the standards of state reorganization.
Ik
That list is still cited in most introductory state govern-
ment texts.
First on Buck's list was "the concentration of au-
thority and responsibility under the elected chief execu-
tive." This necessitated giving the governor power to ap-
point and remove the heads of all administrative depart-
ments. As Buck noted, many states permitted exceptions
to this standard. The argument was that some administra-
tive positions (like the attorney-general for instance)
were too sensitive to be brought under the governor's
control. Buck warned that once exceptions were made for
some agencies it would become easier to ask for still
other exceptions. Buck believed that this was the most
important of the reorganization standards. Its dilution
22
could mean the failure of a reorganization plan.
The second standard called for "the consolidation
of all related administrative functions under one depart-
ment." 2 ^ In the view of Buck and the other early state
reorganizers, implementation of this standard was simply a
technological problem. They believed that it was a matter
of gathering data on all the functions performed by govern-
ment and then assigning similar functions to one depart-
ment . ^
What the early state reorganizers and Buck failed
to understand was that some programs simply do not divide
along neat departmental lines. For instance, what about a
15
program designed to stimulate the sale of agricultural
goods to foreign nations? Does it belong under the State
Department or under the Department of Agriculture? There
is no easy answer to this question. As one writer warned:
the term funct ionalism is, seemingly, capable of
such broad interpretation, or misinterpretation,
that it can be used to justify the creation of a de-
partment which would encompass the entire government.
...in this sense the concept of funct ionalism is
totally valueless as a basis of departmental inte-
gration . 25
The third standard on Buck's list called for "the
elimination of the use of boards for purely administrative
work." Boards and commissions had originated as a means of
insulating administrative work from politics. In practice,
this arrangement had only promoted administrative irrespon-
sibility and the capture of the boards by the special in-
terests. With state problems growing more complex, there
was serious doubt whether a multi-member board was the most
efficient administrative arrangement. For these reasons,
the state reorganizers advocated abolishing all boards ex-
cept those used for regulatory purposes.
The fourth standard of reorganization called for
27
"the provision of staff services to the governor." The
state reorganizers believed that these services were essen-
tial if the governor was to be able to control the admin-
istrative agencies under his supervision. These staff
services would include: special administrative and program
experts who could provide the governor with an independent
16
source of policy information, budget making authority over
all operating agencies, central purchasing, planning, and
central accounting. Evaluating these staff services in a
1950 publication, the Council of State Governments con-
cluded that the budget had become the most important tool
of the twentieth century governor because it offers "the
opportunity for the consideration of all programs and pol-
icies in one consistent frame where they might be com-
pared, their relationships examined, and rational choices
made
.
1,28
Fifth on the list was the "provision for an inde-
pendent audit." 7 This audit was supposed to be the func-
tion of the state legislature. It is interesting to note
that the audit proposal represents the only attempt by the
state reorganizers to improve the legislature's control
over the state bureaucracy.
The final standard called for "the recognition of
the governor's cabinet."^ 0 Neither Buck nor any of the
other reorganizers ever fully explained this standard,
but it can be presumed that they had in mind the model of
the President's cabinet. They envisioned a collegial
body participating with the governor in decision-making.
Unfortunately, this was not the manner in which the federal
cabinet operated. The President has never shared his
decision-making authority with his cabinet. With respect
to the governor, one must conclude that few governors
having just improved their decision-making authority
would want to share it with a cabinet.
To summarize briefly, the beginnings of the state
reorganization movement can be traced to the late nine-
teenth century when government reformers were struggling
against the political machines. The reformers' initial
efforts were directed at making government more respon-
sible to the people. They concentrated their efforts on
removing corrupt politicians from office and replacing
them with "good" men. Beyond that, they seemed to have
no clear idea of what they wanted these "good" men to
do once they were in office.
It was the development of the government research
bureaus which gave the government reform movement its
concern with economy and efficiency. Heavily influenced
by business methods, the government research bureaus
focused their efforts on reorganizing governmental struc-
tures in order to make government more economic and more
efficient. Eventually, they developed a set of standards
which included: 1-concentrat ion of authority and respon-
sibility under the elected chief executive, 2-consolida-
tion of all related administrative functions under one
department, 3-the elimination of the use of boards for
administrative work, 4 -the provision of staff services to
the governor, 5-the provision of an independent audit,
and 6-the recognition of the governor's cabinet. These
18
standards are still used whenever a state undertakes admin-
istrative reorganization. However, it should be noted
that the use of a standardized model has not made the state
reorganization movement anymore successful in achieving its
objectives. Is this because the standards were inadequate
to begin with? Or, is there some other reason for the
failure of the movement?
Why State Reorganization Efforts
Have Not Been More Effective
It is evident to anyone familiar with the last sixty
years of state government that administrative reorganiza-
tions have now become a common occurrence. Since 1917 when
Illinois became the first state to adopt a comprehensive
administrative reorganization plan, every state has en-
gaged in some reorganization activity. Yet despite this
record of frequent adoptions, there is no evidence to
indicate that the reorganization movement has actually
achieved more efficient management or more responsible
state government. On the contrary, the evidence suggests
that duplication and overlapping are still the most common
characteristics of state administration. There is constant
31
worry that state bureaucracy has become uncontrollable.
While there are many reasons one could cite for the in-
effectiveness of the state reorganization movement, three
seem most prominent.
19
1. The failure of the state reorganizers to appreciate the
politics involved in the reorganization process.
When the first state reorganization plans were
being drafted, the prevailing orthodoxy in public admin-
istration included two premises which the early state re-
organizers wholeheartedly endorsed: 1-that organization
theory was a technological problem, i.e., the choices of
agency structure and location were matters to be decided
by objective criteria such as hierarchy, span of control,
etc. and 2-that politics and administration were two
separate processes, with the first the domain of the elected
political officials and the second the domain of the pro-
fessionally trained and politically neutral career adminis-
trators
.
J
As a result, the state reorganizers saw reorganiza-
tion as a technological problem solvable by the applica-
tion of the proper scientific principles. It was almost
unthinkable to the early state reorganizers that opposi-
tion to the reorganization plan could develop since it
was grounded in "scientific methods."! Moreover once a
plan was officially adopted by a state, the reorganizers ex-
pected the administrative specialists to implement it
without hesitation. Thus the early state reorganizers
seldom planned for the implementation phase. They saw no
need for the hiring of special consultants or other admin-
istrative personnel who would oversee the implementation.
Spurred by the belief that reorganization also produced
20
economies in government, the early reorganizers no doubt
would have viewed these extra administrative expenses as
wasteful
!
What the early state reorganizers did not under-
stand was that organization theory is actually a choice of
political strategy because "a choice of organizational
structure is a choice of which interest or which value
will have preferred access or greater emphasis" in the
administrative system. J This is why agencies consider
administrative structure to be so important. They believe
that it may influence decisions on budgets, functions,
programs, personnel, or even agency prestige. Thus, bu-
reaucratic participants (e.g., the agency, its clientele,
the governor, and legislators) will fight to obtain the
kind of organization they believe to be most beneficial
to their interests. Any proposal to change structures,
as would be encompassed in a reorganization plan, is
greeted by them with fear and suspicion. If a reorganiza-
tion plan threatens their interests, it is likely that
bureaucratic participants will try to kill the plan.
Failing this, they will probably try to have the objec-
34
tionable provisions removed from the plan.
Even after a reorganization plan is officially
adopted, there is no guarantee that it will ever be imple-
mented. Administrators are not robots in the policy execu
tion phase. On the contrary, they are influenced by
their professional training, prejudices, interests, etc.
It seems likely then that those who have been adversely
affected by a reorganization will continue their struggle
throughout the implementation phase. In fact, case stud-
ies show that this is where most reorganizations (or more
accurately, their objectives) are defeated. 35 Since the
early state reorganizers did not consider implementation
to be a problem, they did not maintain any vigilance to
assure that their plans were fully implemented. This left
the affected agencies free to maneuver. The result was
very often the nullification of the organization chart on
which the state reorganizers had worked so diligently.
An example from the literature which illustrates
this can be found in Francis Rourke's study of the 19^9 re-
organization of the federal employment security program
under the Department of Labor. The principal opponents
of the reorganization were the state employment offices
which feared that their autonomy would be destroyed under
the proposed reorganization. Except for a brief period
under the War Manpower Commission during World War II,
the state agencies long enjoyed a great deal of discre-
tion and freedom of action under the federal employment
agency. The state employment officials believed that the
proposed reorganization was just a guise for a plan to
nationalize the employment security program and give the
Secretary of Labor complete authority over state actions.
22
Also opposing the reorganization were employers' groups
who feared that the reorganization would result in in-
creased taxes for them. They also believed that the Sec-
retary of Labor could not be a neutral observer in matters
involving wages and workers. Thus, employers' groups ex-
pected the reorganization to result in a biased adminis-
tration of the employment security program. 37
Despite the vigorous objections of these groups, the
19^9 reorganization passed. This did not end the struggle
for control of the employment security program. Shortly
after adoption, the Secretary of Labor threatened to with-
hold federal funds from two states which he claimed were
not complying with federal standards. This was exactly
what the states had feared, and they used the opportunity
to mount a congressional attack on the secretary's author-
ity. Not only did they succeed in forcing the secretary
to withdraw his threat, but they also succeeded in getting
Congress to approve an amendment to the Social Security
Act. That amendment would prevent any further attempt by
o o
the Secretary of Labor to nationalize the system.-3
As this case illustrates, politics is involved
both in the adoption and implementation phases of a reor-
ganization plan. In this particular case, the informal
relationship which existed between the states and the
federal agency proved to be the deciding factor in defeat-
ing the objectives of the 19^9 reorganization plan. Be-
cause state reorganizers have so seldom taken all of these
"political" factors into account, they have not prepared
for the intense struggles which continue long after a plan
is officially adopted by a state. For this reason, many
reorganization plans become just useless additions to
organization charts.
2. The overemphasis on the claim that adoption of struc-
tural reorganization will result in significant monetary
savings for state government.
One of the things that stands out in the rhetoric
of the state reorganization movement is that structural
reorganization was supposed to achieve savings for state
government. The theory was that the consolidation of
overlapping programs and functions and the elimination of
others whose existence could no longer be justified would
produce those economies. ^9 A.E. Buck cited several cases
of states saving millions of dollars just by enacting a
reorganization plan. In his book, Buck urged all propon-
ents of reorganization to use the savings aspect as the
i4 oprincipal selling point for a reorganization.
However a close examination of the record shows
that structural reorganization by itself has never a-
chieved the predicted savings. Lewis Meriam and Laurence
Schmeckebier , in their study of federal reorganizations,
demonstrate that the kind of budget savings envisioned by
the early state reorganizers can only be achieved by the
wholesale elimination of government functions. As the
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authors show, this process of eliminating functions must
begin with the largest departments since they are the
major consumers of a government's budget. However these
also happen to be the long established departments with
powerful interest group and legislative backing. For
this reason, Meriam and Schmeckebier conclude that it is
unlikely that economy measures will begin in these depart-
ments. Therefore, the likelihood of achieving large mone-
tary savings through reorganization is remote.
On the other hand, there is some indication that
improving budget, purchasing and accounting procedures,
introducing central planning, and professionalizing the
career civil service may produce a more efficient govern-
ment. The executive's ability to decide among competing
policies and programs may be enhanced, and the ultimate
result may be the provision of better services to those
h o
who need them. Ironically, the implementation of these
efficiency measures may actually lead to budget increases.
It has been shown that professionalizat ion of the public
service creates built-in pressures to increase government
spending. This arises because professionals want to im-
prove the quality of government services by adopting the
innovative new programs recommended by their disciplines.
In the long run, this is going to increase governmental
expenditures.
It must be concluded then that overemphasizing the
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savings aspect of structural reorganization has fostered
hopes which cannot be realized. As a result, reorganiza-
tion plans are abandoned quickly when the expected sav-
ings do not materialize. Given the great number of re-
organizations that have occurred since 1917, it appears
that states are caught up in a perpetual cycle of adopting
reorganization plans. Some of these abandoned reorganiza-
tion plans are eventually recycled when another period of
reorganization activity occurs. Data on past reorganiza-
tions show that none of this activity has yet produced the
significant savings that were predicted by Buck and the
other early state reorganizers . In the final analysis,
it would appear that this overemphasis on concrete econo-
mies has detracted from the effort to make government more
efficiently managed.
3. The continued inability of the governor to control the
state bureaucracy.
Despite all of the recent efforts to strengthen the
office of the governor, the weakness of the office remains
a major obstacle to achieving an efficient and responsible
administrative system. Part of the problem lies in the
increasing specialization of the state bureaucracy over
the last thirty years. Given the complexity of state
problems, the governor simply cannot compete with the poli-
cy expertise of the bureaucracy. The latter has developed
a finely tuned sense of the "rules of the game." It knows,
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for instance, that despite the governor's statements that
he will not allow a budget increase for the present fiscal
year, there are built-in pressures which will force such
increases over the governor's objections. 1^
The governor is always cast in the role of the
newcomer to the system. He comes into office with little
knowledge of complex policy matters (although he may have
a pet policy which he promotes) and often with no previous
administrative experience. His personal policy staff is
as novice as the governor it is trying to serve. More-
over, just as the governor and his staff are beginning to
acquire some expertise in administrative matters, the
governor's term ends. The cycle then begins anew as a
he
new governor takes office. J
After studying the Illinois budget process, Thomas
Anton was led to conclude that state government could prob-
ably run itself without even having a governor in office.
Anton suspects that the governor is aware of his tenuous
position and that this prompts him to try to prove to the
system that it really needs him. One way the governor can
accomplish this is by championing change: a reorganization
plan or perhaps the adoption of a new program. But there
are limitations on the governor's time and policy exper-
tise. The governor soon finds that he must confine his
change efforts to one agency or one functional area at a
time. The result is that while the governor is preoccu-
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pied with that one area others go virtually unreviewed, some
even for years. Anton concludes that in the end the gover-
nor's change efforts are probably more symbolic than sub-
stantive.^ 6
Another factor in the governor's continuing in-
ability to control the state bureaucracy can be traced to
the growth of the federal grant-in-aid system. By its
nature, the grant system is restrictive since each grant
program arises from a federal decision to promote certain
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policy aims on a national scale. 1 Because the federal
government cannot force a state to participate in the pro-
gram, it must buy the state's cooperation by agreeing to
h Q
bear the largest share of the program's cost. By
1975, there were 975 separate federal assistance programs
hq
with a total value estimated at $51.7 billion. y Obvious-
ly this sum represents an important revenue source which
enables states to expand and improve their services.
However it must also be acknowledged that this grant
system has taken much of the policy initiative and control
from the governor and given it to a "federal/stat e admin-
istrative network."
This network had its origins in the federal require-
ment that state officials operating grant programs be
covered by a merit system. It has been furthered by
federal efforts to introduce educational requirements
for professional staff. In the process, state adminis-
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trators operating federal grant programs have become im-
portant allies of the federal government. They tend to
have policy objectives which are similar to those of their
federal counterparts. Since they are in constant communi-
cation with federal officials, state administrators become
the "official" interpreters of federal policy intentions.
Elected state officials who for the most part have been
left out of those discussions must either accept the ad-
ministrators' interpretations or risk losing federal
grant money for noncompliance.-^
State administrators also play a role in main-
taining state compliance to all federal program regula-
tions. The ultimate weapon which the federal government
has in inducing state compliance is the withholding of
federal funds. In practice this is seldom used since
federal policy aims can only be realized if a program is
functioning. Nevertheless the threat to withhold federal
funds remains an important weapon in federal/state nego-
tiations concerning the level of state compliance. A
state must however be convinced that this threat may be
carried out in its case, and state administrators cooper-
ate with federal officials by convincing state elected
officials that the federal threat is genuine.
In her study of the federal grant system, Martha
Derthick describes how the Massachusetts Public Welfare
Commissioner convinced state legislators that the federal
government would withhold grant funds unless the state
adopted an educational requirement for public welfare case
workers. Derthick feels that this cooperation of state
officials is pivotal in negotiating state compliance.
Without it, federal policy aims cannot be assured. 51
Within the last ten years, there has been an
effort to give the governor and state legislators more
participation in the management of the grant system. A
report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (1977) details the changes which have taken
place since 1968 when the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act was passed during the administration of Lyndon
Johnson. The basic purpose of the 1 968 legislation
was to facilitate coordination among the various federal
grant programs and the levels of government which admin-
istered them. The Advisory Commission's report states
that the Nixon administration made the 1968 legislation
the basis for its "new federalism." According to the re-
port, Nixon felt that the solution to most of the problems
confronting twentieth century government lay in "improved
administration and refined technique." 53 Thus unlike the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the Nixon administra-
tion was predisposed to solving managerial issues.
This inclination was reflected in Nixon's efforts
to consolidate federal grant programs, to reorganize the
federal government, and to create state clearinghouses
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through which state officials could review and comment on
federal-aid programs. 5 ^ The capstone of the Nixon efforts
came with the passage of the State/Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972 (revenue sharing). ^ That legislation pro-
vided for the giving of undedicated federal money directly
to state and local governments for purposes which they
would determine. State officials had long argued that
the grant system thwarted state creativity by placing too
many program restrictions on state administrators. The
Nixon administration was attempting to answer this criti-
cism by returning major decision-making responsibility
to the states. Although it is clear that these efforts
have established the machinery through which the governor
and state legislators can recapture some of the policy
initiative they lost to the bureaucracy, it is still too
early to know how well individual governors are using this
machinery. Moreover there also remains considerable
question whether revenue sharing has actually resulted
in the creation of innovative state policy.
In summary, three reasons seem to account for the
ineffectiveness of the state reorganization movement.
First, state reorganizers have not taken into account the
politics involved in determining organizational structure.
Political actors are concerned with the question of struc-
ture since it may determine which interest will have
greater access to the governor and other decision-making
centers in state government. Therefore, they are willing
to fight to determine the type of structure which they
believe will most favor their interests. If this means
openly opposing a reorganization plan or subverting a
reorganization once it is officially adopted, then they
are prepared to do so. Second, state reorganizers
overemphasized their claims for economies which might
result from reorganization. Studies show that great
economies are not possible unless politicians are willing
to abolish government programs. Since they are not will-
ing to take this step, it is obvious that reorganization
plans are not going to result in any tremendous savings
for government. Third, the power of the governor has
not kept pace with the rapid growth of the state bureau-
cracy. The federal grant-in-aid system has increased
the influence of state administrators since they know
how to deal with their federal counterparts. Although
there have been several changes in the federal grant
system which may improve the governor's chances of in-
fluencing state policy, it is still too soon to evaluate
the effect of these changes.
State Reorganization in the Seventies
Factors contributing to the renewed interest in reorgani-
zation . In spite of the well-publicized past failures of
the state reorganization movement, it now appears that a
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new wave of reorganization activity has begun. Since
1965, nineteen states have undergone comprehensive re-
organization and many others have undertaken reorganiza-
tion studies. J As in the past, the motivations for the
interest in reorganization appear to be similar for most
of these states.
The first and also the most common motivation stems
from the desire to make state administration more effec-
57tive. Over the last decade, there has been growing
concern that government is incapable of responding inno-
vatively to major domestic problems. Governmental struc-
tures are seen as being mired in red tape. Critics
charge that government reacts to a crisis after it hap-
pens rather than anticipates it before it occurs. Thus
instead of arriving at innovative solutions to the prob-
lem, government seems to attempt a patchwork solution
designed to cope with the immediate crisis.
It was in response to those concerns that the
federal government began efforts to improve the grant sys-
tem and to institute reorganization among its own depart-
ments. On the state level, the response has prompted
a renewed interest in reorganization as a means of re-
vitalizing state administration. Supporters believe that
reorganization can create the kind of administrative en-
vironment in which significant policy changes may occur.
The second factor contributing to the recent
interest in reorganization stems from the fiscal crisis in
which many of the states now find themselves. States are
faced with a dwindling base of revenues coupled with an
almost insatiable demand for still more government serv-
58ices. Since most people believe that state taxes are
already too high, it does not seem likely that there
will be any public support for even higher taxes. This
has placed state officials in the unenviable position of
trying to accommodate these demands with the available
resources. Since the two are not equal, something has to
give; or does it?
Many decision makers are claiming that reorganiza-
tion is the solution to their fiscal problems. They say
that the reorganization process will provide them with the
opportunity to reevaluate entrenched programs which nor-
mally are exempt from review in an incremental decision
process. In rhetoric that sounds ominously similar to
A.E. Buck, governors and other state leaders are confi-
dently predicting that significant savings can be achieved
if reorganization plans are adopted. With these savings,
they expect to be able to meet the public's demand for
additional government services. Unfortunately given the
past promises of state reorganizers and their failure to
achieve great economies (or any at all), one has to ques-
tion the advisability of trying to sell the public a sim-
ilar spiel. One also has to wonder whether today's public
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will be so gullible as to accept these extravagant and un-
proved claims.
A third factor in the recent reorganization activ-
ity stems from the states' experience with Planning, Pro-
gramming and Budgeting systems (PPB) during the 1960s.
After the meager accomplishments of the two national
Hoover Commissions and the "little Hoover commissions"
on the state level, many people grew disenchanted with
the state reorganization movement. They had seen the
great promises of the Hoover Commissions dissolve in the
bitter political conflicts over reorganization, and they
were reluctant to go through that again. Evidence of
this can be seen in the fact that there was not much re-
organization activity from the mid-1950s until the present
5 9
wave of reorganization began in 1965-
In a sense, PPB bypassed the reorganization pro-
cess by trying to rationalize the decision process through
a budget system. 60 PPB's proponents claimed that it
could identify major governmental programs, define pro-
gram goals, establish priority among those goals, and offer
alternative approaches to reach those goals. They claimed
that once the decision was made to pursue a certain
program PPB would then serve as the means by which the
elected officials could evaluate the program's effective-
ness.
61
The attempts to implement PPB failed, but in the
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process students of administration rediscovered the value
of reorganization. One of the problems which PPB had
faced was that it created program structures which did
not correspond to actual organizational structures. Thus
program structures had little relevance to the decision
makers or administrators. To adapt PPB program structures
to what PPB's proponents saw as chaotic organizational
structures would have defeated the purpose of PPB.
Therefore, the solution seemed to point toward the creation
of organizational structures which corresponded to the
major program areas of government.
In 1969, the state of Massachusetts tried unsuccess-
fully to implement both a reorganization plan and a PPB
type decision structure called "Program Management Sys-
tem." The architects of the Massachusetts plan believed
that their Program Management System would be an important
tool in the hands of the newly appointed cabinet secre-
taries. According to one official, the budget system
would give the secretaries an extra edge by providing
them with "a clear capability to describe who was doing
what, to whom, at what cost, and with what presumed re-
sults." 63
A fourth factor stems from the effect of the
citizen participation movement of the 1960s. The desire
to make government more responsible to the people was a
major factor in the early state reorganizations. The
36
recent citizen participation movement echoes this desire,
calling for government to be more responsive to people's
needs. The movement seems especially concerned with
government's responsiveness to the needs of poorer
citizens in urban areas. These are the people who have
been underrepresented both in the elected government
offices and in the bureaucracies which administer gov-
ernment programs.
The citizen participation movement gave rise to a
host of demands for community control over neighborhood
schools, community development programs, health services,
and other programs which deliver social and human services.
In some cases, the movement even produced demands that the
regular civil service be bypassed in order to place more
minorities in the bureaucracies. It was reasoned that
this would make government bureaucracy more sympathetic
to the problems facing minority group members and thus
better able to administer the government programs which
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affect them.
The impact of the citizen participation movement has
been especially felt at the local level where community
action programs have succeeded in creating a new sub-
structure of government at the neighborhood level. Many
of these substructures are concerned with the problems of
how to deliver social services to those who need them the
most. The solution has been to create neighborhood in-
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formation or referral centers where residents could be
directed to the services they require. In some cases,
there have also been attempts to create one-stop neighbor-
hood service centers where existing social service agencies
can provide their services under one roof.^5
The impact of the citizen participation movement
has been less visible on the state level. Nevertheless
the climate created by the movement coupled with the
recent court decisions on legislative reapportionment
have had an impact on state government. Recent state re-
organizations have emphasized the need to make state
government more visible and more accessible to the aver-
age citizen. Some of the recent state reorganizations in
the areas of health and human resources have reflected
this by creating regional districts for the delivery of
services. This accomplishes the aims of integration
and it also makes state government more visible in the
community. Given the traditional mistrust of state gov-
ernment, this high visibility cannot help but be a positive
result for state government.
The fifth factor reflects what can best be de-
scribed as "the bandwagon effect." Jack Walker's analy-
sis of state innovations shows that adoption of a new pro-
gram by a pioneering state, either a regional or a national
leader, may trigger the adoption of the same program by
other states. 67 It is not uncommon for states to copy
38
innovative legislation almost verbatim, grammatical and
spelling errors included. Walker speculates that this
copying is the result of the natural reluctance of state
officials to assume the risks of deviating from old
routines. On the other hand, Walker makes it clear
that those risks decrease considerably once states
adopt a new program. In fact, Walker notes that when a
large number of states have adopted the program in
question, it becomes recognized as a legitimate respon-
sibility for all states. That provokes a rush to jump
on the bandwagon before one's state gets the reputation
r o
for being backward.
Looking at state reorganization activity over the
last sixty years, it seems apparent that the same pattern
which Walker describes is also present in the reorganiza-
tion field. The fact is that reorganizations by pioneer-
ing states usually spark intense reorganization activity
among the remainder. Reorganization at the federal level
may also be a spark for state reorganizations. The 1911
Taft Commission, the two Hoover Commissions, and the 1968
Ash Committee were also followed by state reorganization
activity. Judging by the increasing number of states
which have either just adopted reorganization legislation
or which are in the process of considering reports of
reorganization study committees, it seems safe to con-
clude that this bandwagon effect is once again in opera-
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t ion
.
To summarize, there are five factors which appear
to be stimulating the recent interest in state reorganiza-
tion:
(1) the desire to make state administration more effic-
ient
,
(2) the belief that reorganization will result in
financial savings that can be used to pay for addi-
tional government services,
(3) the experience with PPB and other budgeting sys-
tems which pointed up the need to create organiza-
tional structures that corresponded to major program
areas of government,
(^)the citizen participation movement which stimulated
interest in creating governmental structures which are
more responsive to people's needs, and
(5)the reorganization attempts by the federal govern-
ment and several innovative states which have created
a "bandwagon effect" in that other states now feel
compelled to adopt reorganization plans because every-
one is doing it.
Of these five factors, the most important would appear to
be the desire for more efficient governmental adminis-
tration, the quest for additional savings in governmental
operations, and the "bandwagon effect." Interestingly,
these are the same factors which stimulated most of the
interest in state reorganization more than sixty years ago.
Trends in state reorganization activity . Recent activity
in the reorganization field shows considerable diversity in
approach. Within the last ten years, nineteen states have
undergone comprehensive reorganization; however a major-
ity seem to have adopted the more limited approach of
consolidating one major functional area at a time. One
of the areas receiving greatest attention is the human
40
resources field. A 197^ study by the Council of State
Governments reports that twenty-six states have created com
prehensive human resources agencies (CHRAs) which combine
public assistance social-services with at least three
other human resources programs: public health, mental
health, mental retardation, employment services, vocational
rehabilitation, youth institutions, and adult correc-
tions. 69 Another twelve states have what the Council of
State Governments describes as multi-functional human re-
sources agencies. These are agencies which combine pub-
lic assistance-social services with at least one other
. 7 0major human resources program.
Perhaps more important though, the Council of
State Governments study also identifies three states
(Arizona, Georgia, and Washington) which have integrated
CHRAs. The primary difference between a consolidated
CHRA and an integrated CHRA is that the former does not
attempt to dismantle the traditional program lines (i.e.,
each major program area retains responsibility both for
program development and program delivery) whereas the
latter separates program development and program delivery
into two different organizational units. The program
development unit would be responsible for developing all
of the human services programs within the CHRA's juris-
diction. It would also monitor operations and evaluate
performance. The program delivery unit would be respon-
Ill
sible for seeing that all human services functions are
delivered through an agencywide regional delivery sys-
tem. 71
The idea of breaking down traditional program
lines grew out of the realization that the social serv-
ices system was too fragmented both in its organizational
structures and in its approach to the solution of the wel-
fare problem. The feeling was that the typical family on
welfare had several interrelated problems: housing, unem-
ployment, educational, medical, etc. It was felt that
these could only be solved by a "wholistic" approach.
It was not just a question of the services not existing,
but rather that the services were delivered by separate
agencies. These agencies (both governmental and private)
approached the welfare problem from the perspective of a
particular professional specialty. Service providers
were often not even aware of the full range of social
services offered in the community. Thus they were unable
to refer a family to the other services it required. When
such referrals were made, there was no attempt by the re-
ferring agency to see what effect these additional serv-
ices had on the family. The net effect was that the sys-
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tern seemed to foster dependency.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the federal government
sponsored efforts to integrate the social services at the
neighborhood or community level. The earliest efforts
k2
came in the Community Action and Neighborhood Services
Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) in-
volvement began in 1970 when it created a task force
on services integration . ? 3 Qne of the first things to
come out of that effort was a working definition of
social services integration:
The linking together by various means of the serv-
ices of two or more service providers to allow
treatment of an individual's or family's needs
hin a more coordinated and comprehensive nature.'
The HEW task force also recommended that the
department sponsor Service Integration Targets of Oppor-
tunity (abbreviated SITO). The latter are service
agencies which have the capacity to deliver a large number
of social services. The existence of a SITO in a local
community makes it easier for the social service client
since he now has to go to only one agency, rather than
several, in order to receive the services he and his family
require. Between 1971 and 197*1, HEW spent $15 million for
forty-four SITOs located at the regional, county, local,
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and neighborhood levels.
HEW has also demonstrated its support for services
integration at the state level through its sponsorship
7 ft
of the Allied Services Act (1972). Although that legis-
lation has not yet passed in Congress, it indicates HEW's
willingness to supply grant money for state planning in
the services integration area. Another provision of the
bill would have permitted states to transfer up to 30% of
one program's funds to another program if that was con-
sistent with its services integration plan. 77
As might be expected, the traditional profes-
sions have not been very receptive to the concept of serv-
ices integration because it means they lose control over
the programs they have developed. Program specialists
argue that it is neither feasible nor conducive to poli-
tical accountability to divorce program development from
services delivery. They especially resent the intrusion
of generalist control (under services integration, the
generalists would deliver the actual services), and they
claim that the generalists cannot possibly understand all
of the purposes involved in the creation of a particular
program. Thus, it is likely that the new CHRA head will
find it difficult to maintain agency morale and to secure
the cooperation of the program specialists. In the long
run, the ability of the CHRA head to achieve these will
probably determine the success or failure of the services
7 8integration concept at the state level.
A second development which has especially been
welcomed by the governor is the power to reorganize by
executive order. 79 Up to now, that power has been granted
only to the President of the United States. If a state
governor wanted to reorganize a particular agency, he had
to seek the passage of a statute or the adoption of a con-
4iJ
stitutional amendment. This has recently changed since
at least thirteen states have passed legislation permitting
the governor to issue executive orders reorganizing the
state administrative structures.^ 0 As in the case of
the federal legislation, the new state legislation
gives the state legislatures the power to veto the
governor's action within a prescribed period of time.
Supporters of this new state legislation believe
that it will give the governor the capability of reacting
much more quickly to the management needs of a large ad-
ministrative system. However they should be cautioned
that this new authority represents no magic panacea for
a governor's problems with the state bureaucracy. Just
as Presidents have found it difficult to use an executive
order to carry out reorganization, it is likely that
governors will encounter similar problems. For example:
when President John F. Kennedy tried to create a Depart-
ment of Urban Affairs by executive order, it was rejected
O -l
by a congressional committee veto. Because of that
rejection, his successor, President Lyndon Johnson,
decided to submit his plans for the creation of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development and the Depart-
ment of Transportation as legislation for congressional
consideration. Like President Johnson, most governors
may find it prudent in some cases to submit their reor-
8 2
ganization plans in the form of legislation.
The third development, sunset legislation, appeared
in 1976. Technically, sunset legislation is not the same
thing as reorganization. However, its supporters claim
that sunset legislation may actually accomplish what
past reorganizations have failed to do: elimination of
the overlapping and duplication among state agencies
and the termination of those agencies whose services are
no longer required. What makes sunset legislation u-
nique is that it sets an automatic termination date for
every agency. If the state legislature takes no posi-
tive action to restart the agency (by passing a new en-
O o
abling act), then the agency ceases to exist.
In order to restart an agency, a legislature is
required to undertake what amounts to a zero-based re-
view of the agency's programs and services. The burden of
proof in this process rests on the agency and its sup-
porters. They must demonstrate to the legislature that
there is continued need for the agency. As a result of
the review, the legislature may decide to reenact new
enabling legislation, to terminate the agency, or to
merge it with other agencies performing similar func-
tions. In order to lessen the burden on the legisla-
ture, most states with sunset legislation provide that
the zero-based review process will occur on a staggered
basis. During the review phase, all agencies with simi-
84
lar functions are examined together.
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Supporters of the sunset concept point out that
this gives the state legislature a very important role
in overseeing the bureaucracy. As already noted in
this chapter, the state reorganization movement virtu-
ally ignored the legislature in the oversight process.
Obviously, the sunset concept could become an important
tool for the state legislature, but its success will
probably depend upon the particular legislature conducting
the review process as well as the staff which the legis-
lature has at its disposal.
Colorado was the first state to enact sunset
legislation (1976). Since then, ten other states have
followed that course. What is disturbing is that six
of those other states have adopted much more comprehen-
sive legislation than Colorado. The latter state viewed
its sunset legislation as only experimental. For that
reason, the sunset concept was limited to licensing and
regulatory agencies. The sunset legislation enacted in
Arkansas, Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota extends to every administrative agency in
state government . ^5 Since the legislatures of these
six states do not have the reputation for being very
strong, it should be interesting to see whether the sun-
set concept fares well in these states.
It may be that the sunset concept is just what
state government has long needed. On the other hand, it
may also be that the sunset concept is just another lofty
proposal of the government reform movement. The key
seems to be the willingness and the ability of the
legislature to take advantage of the new tool. Based on
the experience of the states already possessing sunset
legislation, there is little evidence to suggest that
this is happening.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the state reorganiza-
tion movement had its beginnings in the efforts of the
nineteenth century reformers to make government more re-
sponsible to the people. Those early efforts concentrated
on electing "good men" to governmental offices. The
reformers also introduced measures which were designed
to assure that the average citizen could control his
government. As the record shows, the reformers managed
to elect some of their candidates, but their reform
measures were largely ineffective.
With the creation of the municipal research
bureaus in the early 1900s, the concern of the movement
shifted toward making government more efficient and more
economical. Unfortunately the state reorganizers never
succeeded in making state government either more respon-
sible or more efficient. They had not counted on the
politics that is involved in reorganizing governmental
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structures. They assumed that once a reorganization plan
was adopted by a state it would be fully implemented.
In retrospect, it also appears that the early state re-
organizers over sold the savings claim of reorganization.
The only way those kinds of savings could have been
realized was through wholesale cuts in government serv-
ices, but the state reorganizers never fully explained
that to the public. Finally, the power of the governor
never seemed to keep pace with the rapidly expanding state
bureaucracy. It will take more than a reorganization
plan to give the governor complete control over the
state bureaucracy.
Over the last ten years, there has been renewed
interest in reorganization. As this chapter has indi-
cated, the motivations for this renewed interest are very
similar to those for past reorganizations. States still
want more efficient and more responsible governments.
Many states seem to be grasping at reorganization in
the hope that it will result in huge savings which can then
be used to finance necessary services. Based on past
record, the reader should be extremely skeptical of these
savings claims.
While it is still too soon to know whether the
latest round of reorganizations will be any more success-
ful than the past ones, it does appear that recent develop-
ments hold some promise. The sunset concept is especially
significant because it brings the state legislature into
the oversight process. Previous reorganization efforts
all but ignored the role of the state legislature. The
sunset concept gives a central role to the legislature
as it evaluates whether agencies should be terminated
or "re-started." Another development that rates some
interest is the extension of reorganization authority
to the governor. Several states now permit the governor
to issue executive orders (subject to legislative veto)
reorganizing state agencies.
The fact that states are now actively involving
both the legislature and the governor in the reorganiza-
tion process seems to reflect the growing realization
that reorganization is a political decision and not just
a technical matter. Moreover, the sunset concept empha-
sizes the continuing need for periodic review of organiza-
tional structures and purposes. Early state reorganizers
looked on reorganization as basically a "one shot affair."
The sunset concept suggests that organization needs a
periodic and regular review so that duplication can be
eliminated and archaic agencies can be terminated.
Based on this reexamination of the state reorganiza-
tion movement, one must conclude that state reorganization
efforts have for the most part been very unsuccessful.
Even though there appears to be enthusiasm for the latest
round of reorganization, one suspects that the results
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will also be disappointing. In spite of the past failures
of the reorganization movement, Louisiana has joined the
reorganization bandwagon. Chapter II will discuss the
reasons for this action and will look at some of the
results
.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO THE 1973 LOUISIANA REORGANIZATION
Introduc t ion
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the
background to the 1973 Louisiana reorganization. A sur-
vey of recent Louisiana history reveals that the state
reorganization movement has not had much success in getting
reorganization plans adopted by Louisiana. Except for an
abortive attempt in 19^0, Louisiana has remained largely
outside the general state reorganization movement. Why
has Louisiana been the exception? One reason for this may
lie in the fact that Louisiana governors have not sup-
ported reorganization efforts to the same extent as have
governors in other states. As Chapter I demonstrates,
the support of the governor is often the key factor in
getting a reorganization plan adopted. Governors have
seen reorganization as a way of increasing their con-
trol over the state bureaucracy and thereby gaining more
influence over the policy-making process. However, the
Louisiana governor was already a powerful figure in
state politics. Therefore, he had less to gain, and per-
haps even more to lose, from a reorganization.
It is interesting to note that the 1973 reorgan-
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ization was not only supported by the governor, but it
was also initiated by him. Why the change? Perhaps one
reason is that Louisiana politics itself (especially the
character of the bifactional system) has changed greatly
since 19*40. It is now much more likely that the governor
will see reorganization as being advantageous to his inter-
ests .
Chapter II also examines the debate over Governor
Edwards' reorganization plan, and it suggests how and why
the governor managed to get his plan approved by the state
legislature. The chapter concludes with a look at the
agencies included in the consolidation and a brief examin-
ation of the powers and functions of the new health-welfare
department
.
Failure of Earlier Reorganization Efforts
For the first twenty years after the historic 1917
Illinois reorganization, Louisiana all but ignored the
movement. In 1921, the state convened a constitutional
convention, thus presenting an opportunity for reorganiza-
tion proponents to initiate administrative reorganization.
The constitution which came out of that convention vio-
lated most of the tenets of the administrative reorganiza-
tion movement. For example, the 1921 constitution con-
tinued the practice of electing the important administra-
tive officers and also continued the use of boards and
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commissions for administrative work. 1
It was not until 19^0 that the first comprehen-
sive reorganization was attempted. This reorganization
came as a direct result of the "Louisiana hayride scan-
dals" of 1939. Those scandals forced Governor Richard
Leche, the political heir of Huey Long, to resign from
office. Eventually, Governor Leche and several of his
supporters were convicted of federal income tax evasion
and of using the United States mail to defraud.
Those scandals set the stage for a reform campaign
during the 1940 gubernatorial election. The Long machine
candidate was Earl K. Long, the brother of the late Gover-
nor Huey Long. The reform candidate was Sam H. Jones.
The latter' s previous political experience was as a dele-
gate to the 1921 constitutional convention and as an
assistant district attorney. As part of his campaign,
Jones promised fiscal and administrative reform, a re-
duction in the immense powers accumulated by the governor's
office during the Long era, and reform of the state's
election laws. It is interesting to note that while
Jones spoke out against the excesses of the Long machine,
he was careful to affirm his support for the liberal
social-welfare policies of the Longs. Jones even prom-
ised to increase educational and welfare expenditures
(including a $30 monthly pension for the state's aged)
and to abolish the state sales tax.
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Jones won the runoff primary over Earl Long, but
his margin of victory was a narrow one: 51.8% to 48.2$.
With this limited reform mandate, Governor Jones set about
the task of fulfilling his campaign promises. First on
the agenda was his reorganization pledge. To accomplish
this, Governor Jones hired the Chicago research firm,
Griffenhagen and Associates, to prepare a list of the
state agencies which could be abolished. The firm was
also charged with the responsibility of making specific
recommendations for achieving greater economies in govern-
ment operations.
The plan which resulted closely followed the ortho-
dox reorganization standards. It proposed consolidating
the state's 122 administrative agencies under twenty de-
partments, and it provided that department heads would be
subject to gubernatorial appointment and removal. The
Griffenhagen plan also proposed that the governor be
given authority to prepare the state budget. Finally,
it laid out a plan for bringing state employees under a
5
civil service system.
Governor Jones submitted his reorganization plan
to the legislature in the form of three legislative bills
(a fiscal code, an administrative code, and a civil serv-
ice code) and two proposed constitutional amendments
(one giving constitutional force to the fiscal and admin-
istrative codes and the second embedding the civil serv-
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ice in the constitution). The Longites in the legislature
opposed the plan. They argued that the Griffenhagen pro-
posals would expand the governor's powers beyond anything
Huey Long had proposed while he was in office. They also
opposed the civil service plan because they recognized
that its passage would eliminate most of the patronage
jobs upon which the political machine depended.
Facing so much legislative opposition, Governor
Jones was forced to accept major modifications in his
plan. He agreed that thirteen of the proposed new depart-
ments should be given appointed boards and that all of
the departments with popularly elected heads should be
allowed to retain this method of selection. Governor
Jones also agreed to drop the idea of imbedding the civil
service system in the constitution. He opted instead
for a constitutional amendment which specified that any
change in city or state civil service laws would have
7
to be approved by two-thirds of both legislative houses.
The legislature eventually approved the watered
down version of the reorganization plan. From there,
Governor Jones turned to the voters for their approval
of the two constitutional amendments. These were narrowly
approved in November, 19^0; however Governor Jones' reform
victory was shortlived. Within six months, the Louisiana
Supreme Court (still a stronghold of the Long machine)
held that the constitutional amendment giving force to
the fiscal and administrative codes was invalid. The
legislature had failed to specify the exact date on
which the amendment was to be submitted to the voters for
their approval. In 19^2, the Court invalidated the
fiscal and administrative codes on the grounds that these
legislative acts could not be separated from the already
invalidated amendment. All that remained of the Jones
reforms was the civil service law. This last vestige
of reform fell in 19^8 when the state legislature, once
o
again dominated by the Long faction, repealed the law.
After the failure of the 19^0 reorganization, it
was impossible to get any other comprehensive reorganiza-
tion legislation passed by the legislature. The legis-
lature did however continue to undertake sporadic reor-
ganizations of individual departments. Certainly one
of the reasons for this poor record must be traced to
the aftermath of the 19^0 reorganization struggle. 9 To
the Longs, reorganization became a code word for the ef-
forts of the anti-Longs to destroy the machine and its
liberal social-welfare policies. To the anti-Longs, re-
organization became a symbol for the turning away from
political favoritism and patronage, abuse of the gover-
nor's powers, and a politicized bureaucracy that does the
bidding of the faction in power. It appeared that com-
prehensive reorganization would continue to be blocked as
long as reorganization remained a focal issue between the
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two factions.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the bifactional
system remained a factor in Louisiana politics, and no
comprehensive reorganization was passed. With the decline
of the bifactional system in the 1960s, one might have
thought that the chances of passing comprehensive reor-
ganization would improve, but this did not happen. 10
This is even more surprising in view of the fact that
Louisiana had a two term governor from 1964-1972
.
11
The experience from other states suggests that the
1 2governor's role is pivotal in a reorganization struggle.
The reason for this lies in the fact that it is the gover-
nor who stands to gain the most if a reorganization is
adopted. Therefore, it is he who initiates the discussion
about reorganization, often making it a campaign issue.
After the election, the governor uses the successful
adoption of a comprehensive reorganization plan as the
major accomplishment of his administration. Surely then,
it would seem that if reorganization were to be success-
ful in Louisiana it would have come during the period
from 1964-1972. Afterall, a governor who was persuasive
enough to get the state's voters to change the constitu-
tional limit of one term for a governor should also be
able to secure the passage of a reorganization plan.
But the fact is that in Louisiana the governor
does not have that much to gain through the adoption of
a reorganization plan. Historically the Louisiana gover-
nor has always been the dominant actor in the state's
policy-making process. 13 His legislative powers are im-
mense. He appoints committee chairman as well as the
entire membership of the Legislative Budget Committee.
The latter is an anomalous legislative committee which
works with the governor's budget director in the prep-
aration of the state's budget. 1 ^
The governor can even influence a legislator's
salary through his power to appoint the members of the
interim committees that conduct legislative business
between annual sessions. Since these committees pay
their members on a per diem basis, the legislator who
serves on several of these committees can increase his
salary substantially. The most significant statistic,
however, which illustrates the governor's dominance over
the legislature is that not a single gubernatorial veto
15
was overridden under the 1921 constitution.
The governor's position vis-a-vis the administra-
tive system has also been strong. For instance, although
over Q0% of the state budget is derived from dedicated
revenues,
16 this has not diminished the governor's budget
authority since he appoints many of the executives in the
departments utilizing dedicated funds. In 1964, the
governor appointed approximately 1,100 top-level executives
and influenced the selection of many lower-level state
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executives
.
To summarize, the Louisiana governor is a power-
ful figure in state politics. Even without the benefit
of reorganization, he appoints many of the top level
executives in state government. He also has consider-
able influence over the state legislature. He appoints
committee chairman and the entire membership of the
interim legislative committees. No gubernatorial veto
has been overridden since the 1921 constitution went
into effect. Based on these observations, it must be
concluded that the Louisiana governor really does not
have that much to gain by supporting reorganization. He
would acquire the power to appoint many of the positions
which are presently elective, but he would also lose
many of his executive appointments to civil service.
Moreover since administrative reform is frequently
accompanied by efforts to institute legislative reform,
the net effect might be to increase the role of the
legislative body at the expense of the governor. Given
these possibilities, it is suggested here that the
Louisiana governor might decide he is better off with an
unreformed administrative system. No matter how chaotic
this system appears to outside observers, it is a sys-
tem which the governor can control.
If these observations are correct, the next ques-
tion should be: what made Edwin Edwards decide to conduct
a reform campaign for governor in 1971-72? The answer
seems to be that revelations of corruption during the
McKeithen administration made conditions ripe for such a
campaign. Also, Edwards needed an issue which would
make him stand out in a crowded field of seventeen
candidates running in the first Democratic primary.
The Emergence of Reorganization as a
Campaign Issue in 1972
The McKeithen administration . It was ironic that Governor
John McKeithen' s administration was ending amid scandal
because he had been a popular governor, the first in
modern state history to serve two consecutive terms in
office. The record of McKeithen's first term (1964-68)
was generally considered to have been very good. He
had begun a successful campaign to induce northern in-
dustries to relocate In Louisiana, and for this achieve-
ment, he had earned considerable media and business
community support. McKeithen's greatest triumph, however,
19
came unexpectedly in the area of race relations.
In the summer of 1965, a group of racial moder-
ates in Bogalusa, Louisiana invited former Congressman
Brooks Hays to speak on the 1964 civil rights act.
Bogalusa is a small papermill town located north of New
Orleans in a region that has long been a stronghold of
the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan was unhappy that this
68
"southern integrat ionist " had been invited to speak in its
midst, and it promised to picket the Hays speech. In
order to avoid a confrontation, the mayor of Bogalusa
urged the sponsors of the Hays speech to withdraw their
invitation. This created more trouble since black
groups felt that the community should not accede to
the Klan's demands. They announced their own demonstra-
tions to protest the mayor's actions, and simultaneous-
ly, state black leaders announced that concentrated de-
segregation efforts would begin in Bogalusa. 20
Governor McKeithen realized that black protests
in Bogalusa might erupt in violence between blacks and
whites. He feared that this violence could then spread
to other sections of the state. In a surprise move, the
governor went on statewide television to denounce violence
and also to announce that he was appointing a biracial
committee to mediate the Bogalusa dispute. In return,
the blacks agreed to a thirty day cooling-off period.
Because of his success with the biracial committee, the
governor decided to appoint a permanent statewide com-
mittee to handle any future racial disputes. For a
southern governor in 1965, and especially one who had
used the race issue to get elected, McKeithen's actions
were impressive and marked him as one of the racial
21
moderates of the south.
By 1966, Governor McKeithen found himself in a
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unique position for any politician. His principal oppo-
nents from the 1964 election were no longer factors to
be considered in gubernatorial politics. Moreover, pub-
lic opinion polls indicated that a large majority of the
state's voters felt that McKeithen was doing a good job
22in office.
McKeithen realized that he had an excellent chance
to be reelected in 1968
.
The only barrier to this was
the 1921 constitution which prohibited the governor from
serving two consecutive terms in office. Several past
Louisiana governors had skirted this issue by sitting
out four years and then running again when they were
eligible. For example, Earl Long served his first term as
governor from 19^8 to 1952. Since he was not eligible
for reelection, Long sat out the next four years. He
then ran again in 1956 and was elected to another four
2^year term. -
McKeithen decided that he did not want to sit out
four years. Therefore, he proposed an amendment to remove
the two term restriction on the governor. While there
was opposition to the amendment, McKeithen' s arguments
were persuasive. He argued that the restriction against
two consecutive terms unfairly penalized the governor who
had done a good job in office. McKeithen reasoned that
it was only fair in a democracy to let the voters decide
whether a governor deserved a second term. He also claimed
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that a governor was more likely to do a good job if he
knew he faced an election in four years.
McKeithen readily acknowledged that the Louisiana
governor was already a powerful figure in state politics,
and he agreed to support an effort to trim some of the
appointive powers of the governor. Toward that goal,
McKeithen appointed a blue-ribbon committee headed by
ex-governor Sam Jones. The committee was charged with
making specific recommendations on ways to cut the gover-
nor's powers. Those recommendations (nine amendments
to the constitution) along with the two term amendment
appeared on the ballot in November, 1966, and they
received almost 70% of the vote of those who actually
2 5participated in the amendment election. J That outcome
also assured that Governor McKeithen would have little
opposition in the 1967 Democratic primaries. He easily
defeated Congressman John Rarick (winning with 80.6% of
the vote), and the Republican Party did not even bother
2 6
to nominate a challenger for the general election.
The 1967 primary was the high point of McKeithen'
s
popularity. For the next four years, there was one rev-
elation after another concerning corruption in state
government. Much of the governor's troubles stemmed
from a series of articles which Life magazine ran in
1967 and 1970. 27 Those articles alleged that organized
crime figures had received special treatment from state
officials. One charge related to the special handling
which the Department of Revenue and Taxation had given to
the affairs of reputed crime boss Carlos Marcello. An-
other Life article charged that Marcello even had a pri-
vate telephone line to the governor's office. 2 ^ It was
later shown that only one McKeithen aide had ever had
access to that phone. That aide resigned; however
McKeithen subsequently appointed him to head the Depart-
ment of Public Works. The governor's administrative
judgment was shown to be faulty when that same aide
was indicted on public bribery charges and forced to
resign from the department. By that time, McKeithen'
s
reputation was irreparably damaged. Even the once bright
industrial picture turned sour when labor disputes
broke out in Baton Rouge, the state's capitol. There was
evidence of labor racketeering, and violence on the work-
site was commonplace. McKeithen appointed another blue-
ribbon committee to mediate the dispute, but this time
he lacked the political resources to force a compromise
solution. 2 9 By the close of McKeithen's second term, it
was obvious to most veteran political observers that re-
form was going to be the major issue in the 1971-72 gu-
bernatorial election.
Factional instability, the black vote, and voter unrest.
When the 1940 reorganization was attempted, there was a
strong bifactional system composed of the Long and anti-
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Long forces. By 1972, that system had been replaced by a
multifactlonal system similar to that found in other one-
party states. In such a system, there are transient poli-
tical alliances which change from one election to another
depending upon the issues and the candidates. Usually
a large number of candidates run in the first primary.
For example, there were seventeen candidates entered in
the state's first Democratic primary in 1971. Each can-
didate in a multifactlonal system tries to capitalize on
what V.O. Key called "localism." This is a strategy in
which a candidate tries to pile up as many votes as pos-
sible in his home area in the hope that this will be suf-
ficient to put him in the runoff primary. During the
runoff, there is a great deal of trading off as the first
primary victors deal for the votes of the defeated candi-
dates .
Another new factor in the 1971-72 campaign was
the presence of black political organizations which might
be instrumental in swinging the election to one candidate.
With the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the black
vote in Louisiana was becoming an important factor in
state elections. Its importance had been clearly demon-
strated in the 1970 mayoral election in New Orleans when
Moon Landrieu captured the majority of the organized black
support in the city. 31 Most political observers felt that
it was this support which had enabled Landrieu to win.
Going into the 1971 gubernatorial primaries, the support
of the black political organizations, particularly those
in the New Orleans area, was seen by potential candidates
as the factor which might determine the outcome of the
governor's race.
However the most important factor in the 1971-72
gubernatorial campaign probably was the degree of public
interest in reform. It has often been said that Louisiana
voters have a high tolerance for political corruption. As
one observer suggested: "Where Louisiana has few peers and
no superiors is in the cavalier spirit with which it meets
political corruption face to face, and passes by with an
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amiable, almost sympathetic nod." J The 19^0 reorganiza-
tion struggle shows that it takes a political scandal of
immense proportions to arouse the Louisiana voters to
support reform candidates. It was evident by 1971 that
Louisiana's voters were once again in one of those rare
reform moods. Interest had been building since the em-
barrassing revelations about organized crime were published
in Life magazine. That interest reached a climax when
voters rejected the fifty-three amendments on the ballot
in the November, 1970 general election.
Ever since the adoption of the 1921 constitution,
the Louisiana voters had been besieged by an increasing
number of amendment proposals on the ballot. The 1921
constitution had made it relatively easy for the legisla-
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ture to propose amendments, and apparently the legislature
felt no constraint to use the amendment process judicious-
33ly. As a result, the number of proposed amendments sub-
mitted to the voters during a legislative year increased
dramatically. In the 1920s, the number of proposed amend-
ments averaged thirteen; in the 1930s, it was up to twen-
ty; and in the 1940s, the average was twenty-seven. By
the 1950s, the voters were deciding on the merits of an
average of thirty-five amendments at every election.
During the 1960s, the voters were being overwhelmed by
an average of forty-nine amendment proposals .
^
The sheer volume was not the only burden on the
voters. The amendments were framed in technical language
and often referred to previous constitutions or to some
obscure statute. In addition, many amendments dealt with
local issues that were of concern only to the parish or
municipality affected by the proposal. For instance, in
the November, 1966 election forty-five amendments were on
the ballot. Twenty-one of these were declared by the
sceretary-of-state to be local in nature. This meant
that all of the voters would be deciding such issues as:
whether the registrar of voters in Orleans Parish should
be chosen by the city council and whether the sewerage
35
and water rates in New Orleans should be increased.
Obviously few voters statewide had enough information to
make an intelligent decision on these questions. Yet,
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year after year, the legislature asked the voters to try.
The voters eventually developed their own method of deal-
ing with the problem: some indiscriminately approved all
of the amendments while others indiscriminately voted
against all of the amendments. The majority of the
voters, however, simply refused to participate in the
amendment process.
^
In the November, 1970 election, there were fifty-
three amendment proposals, of which thirty pertained to
localities. The Public Affairs Research Council of
Louisiana (abbreviated PAR) pointed out that several of
the proposals contained drafting errors and that others
had the same objective but conflicted. Apparently the
voters had finally had enough. A statewide media cam-
paign was begun to get the voters to reject all of the
amendments. The outcome of the election showed that only
2k% of the state's registered voters had even bothered
to cast their ballots on election day. Of those who did
vote however, they overwhelmingly rejected every amendment
on the ballot. As PAR concluded in its post election
analysis: "The skies were sunny over Louisiana on
November 3rd, but on November 4th, quite a few public
officials seemed to have the distinct impression that
37
a storm had hit .
"
In the final analysis, it must be concluded that
it was a combination of the political instability, the
black vote, and the voter unrest which made the 1971-72
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gubernatorial campaign unique in Louisiana political hist-
ory. The growth of multifactionalism left the political
situation more unstable than usual. This forced the voters
to contend with a large number of gubernatorial candi-
dates, most of whom were reciting the litany of reform.
The increasing importance of the black vote after 1965
was felt in the sense that politicians now began to
direct their campaigns to black voters. Finally, the
misuse of the amendment process by the state legislature
produced a voter backlash against all amendment propos-
als. Some worthwhile amendments were rejected in the
1970 voter rebellion, but the voters did not seem to
mind. They were weary of trying to make decisions which
they believed should have been made by the state legis-
lature. By 1971, many Louisiana voters were coming to
believe that not every politician was "a good 'ole boy!"
The primary campaign . Seventeen candidates filed for the
first Democratic primary in 1971. However not all of them
could be described as "serious" contenders. Many ob-
viously qualified in the hope that some miracle would put
them in the runoff. The list of serious candidates in-
cluded: Congressman Edwin Edwards, state senator J. Bennett
Johnston (now a United States Senator), former Congressman
Gillis Long (since then, he has been reelected to the
House of Representatives), state senator John Schwegmann
(he had led the media campaign against the amendments on
the 1970 ballot), and Samuel Bell (he was an official with
the black political organization SOUL, the Southern Organ-
ization for Unified Leadership).^
The first primary provided the kind of jockeying
for support that one would have expected in a one-party
multifactional system. Several of the candidates tried
to wrap themselves in the reform mantle by calling for
constitutional revision, administration reorganization,
a code of ethics for public officials, and financial re-
form (including the abolition of the practice of per-
mitting state agencies to maintain separate bank accounts).
Long, Edwards and Johnston competed fiercely for
the endorsements of the black political organizations.
The New Orleans States-Item later reported that these
three candidates each spent between $50,000 and $100,000
for the endorsements of the major black political organ-
izations in the New Orleans area.^ 0 Most of that support
went to Gillis Long in the first primary. He was gener-
ally conceded to be the most liberal candidate in the
race. However, Long's overall support was not broad
enough among other segments of the state's population
to put him into the runoff primary. He finished a strong
41
third to Johnston and Edwards.
Both Congressman Edwards and Bennett Johnston
could be classified as political moderates. Edwards had
a solid base of support among the French-Catholic parishes
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in south Louisiana (his home area), but Johnston's support
was more varied. The latter' s support ran from his home
area in north Louisiana (primarily the urban area around
Shreveport ) to the suburban areas across the state. Al-
though Johnston campaigned vigorously for black politi-
cal endorsements, Edwards managed to get the majority
of them in the second primary. Coupled with his solid
base of support in south Louisiana and his strong labor
support, this was enough to give Edwards the margin of
victory.
The Edwards Reorganization Plan
Initiation of the plan
.
Despite Governor Edward's campaign
pledge to institute reform, there remained considerable
doubt whether he would push very hard to carry out those
promises. The revelations about corruption had left many
voters cynical about the promises of politicians. As one
Baton Rouge attorney noted, many voters in the state be-
lieved that reform in Louisiana consisted of "turning out
the fat hogs and letting the lean hogs in." J Those doubts
were largely dispelled after the governor's first address
to the legislature.
In that speech, Governor Edwards stressed the need
to make Louisiana government "more visible, more reflec-
tive of a society coming to grips with the latter part of
the twentieth century."^ To accomplish this, the gover-
79
nor announced that he was recommending comprehensive reor-
ganization legislation, reform of the state's election
laws, constitutional revision, creation of a consumer
protection agency, abolition of the practice of main-
taining separate agency bank accounts, and the institu-
tion of new procedures for the collection of state rev-
enues.
The governor readily conceded in his speech that
his legislative package would be a very ambitious one.
However he put the legislature on notice that he ex-
pected positive results from his proposals. He also
warned the legislature that the voters were no longer
in the mood to tolerate "politics as usual." Recent
events, said Edwards, confirmed that the voters were in
the mood for serious political and administrative reform.
Edwards made it clear to the legislature that he intended
to fight for a record on which he could successfully run
for reelection in four years.
The first item on the agenda was the reorganiza-
tion of the administrative structure of state government.
The governor had begun to tackle this problem even before
he took office. He had requested the "Flying Feds" of the
Federal Technical Assistance Program to make a study of
Louisiana's government. What they came up with was a plan
to consolidate the state's 267 agencies under 15-25 cabinet
departments . ^ By the time Edwards took office, he had
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decided, however, on a more conservative approach, covering
only those agencies which could be readily reorganized
by legislative enactment. The reorganization of the con-
stitutional agencies and boards was a chore that Edwards
wanted to leave for the constitutional convention which
he was hoping to convene sometime in 1973.
The Edwards reorganization plan called for the
consolidation of 132 state agencies under seven new
cabinet departments:
1. Professional and Occupational Affairs
2. Art, Culture, and Historical Preservation
3. Human Services
4. Health, Social, and Rehabilitation Services
5. Environmental Protection
6. Consumer Protection
7. Local Affairs, Planning, and Development
In addition, the plan called for the abolition of thirty-
one dormant agencies, including the Louisiana Sovereignty
Commission and the Louisiana Council on Governmental Reor-
ganization. Rather than submit the plan as one omnibus
reorganization bill (as suggested by the federal study),
Governor Edwards chose the strategy of submitting the plan
as separate legislative bills. That way should one or
more of the bills be defeated (and Governor Edwards ap-
parently felt that this was a good possibility), the en-
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tire reorganization plan would not go down in defeat.
General reaction to the plan . There were three contro-
versial sections of the reorganization plan. The first
called for the transfer of the powers of the state comp-
troller to the office of the state treasurer. This prob-
ably would not have aroused much opposition were it not
for the fact that both offices were elective. By pro-
posing a change in their powers, Edwards was violating
the unwritten law that elected administrative officials
should be free to run their departments without inter-
ference from the governor. Edwards promised to con-
tinue the salary of the incumbent comptroller for his
full four year term. He also promised to find some new
functions for the comptroller to perform. But this was
little consolation for that official. He charged that
the governor had no authority to change the duties of
the office. That, argued the incumbent comptroller,
could only be accomplished through a constitutional
amendment. 1* 8
A second part of the governor's plan called for
the transfer of twenty-six parish levee boards to the
Department of Public Works. From the outset, this prom-
ised to evoke considerable opposition because of the
political nature of the parish levee boards. The latter
are independent from both local and parish governments.
They are governed by multi-member boards that are ap-
pointed by the governor.^ 9 For the most part, Louisiana
governors have used their levee board appointments to
supplement their regular state patronage.
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Membership on levee boards is highly valued because
the boards are involved in the acquisition of land for lev-
ees as well as their actual construction and maintenance.
Since about one-third of the state must be protected by
levees, levee boards are involved in awarding contracts
and purchasing land valued at several million dollars. 5°
Opposition to the governor's reorganization proposal came
from the levee boards and the contractors who do business
with the levee boards. They believed that the transfer of
the levee boards to the Department of Public Works would
upset the traditional means by which levee boards con-
ducted their business.
Reaction to the health-welfare proposal . The third area
of controversy centered on the consolidation of fifty-
nine agencies under the Department of Health, Social, and
Rehabilitation Services (abbreviated DHSRS). This depart-
ment would be headed by a commissioner who would serve as
the chief executive authority of the department. The
agencies affected by the consolidation included all of the
state's general care public hospitals, all state mental
institutions and clinics, all state schools and facili-
ties for the mentally retarded, and the departments of
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health, hospitals, and public welfare.
Given the longstanding fragmentation of the state's
health-welfare system, it is not surprising that some of
the agencies and their supporters opposed the governor's
reorganization proposal. Many felt that the consolidation
would create a department which was too large to respond
to the needs of individual citizens. They did not be-
lieve that the commissioner of this new department
would be able to control all of the agencies supposed-
ly under his jurisdiction. These people recommended
that the department be given a board with considerable
decision-making authority. The Louisiana State Medical
Society recommended that the board should be given com-
plete authority over the consolidated department, in-
cluding the power to appoint the commissioner. Such a
board would be chosen from a slate of candidates submitted
by the Louisiana State Medical Society, the Louisiana
Hospital Association, and the State Health Planning
Advisory Committee. The supporters of the governor's
proposal countered with the argument that the board ar-
rangement would hinder the governor and would in the
long run give too much influence to special interest
52groups
.
Other opponents of the health-welfare reorganiza-
tion included Tulane and Louisiana State University (LSU)
medical schools. These two schools provided most of the
medical staff for Charity Hospital in New Orleans, the
nation's second largest public hospital. Although
Tulane and LSU did not oppose the consolidation of
Charity Hospital under the umbrella agency, they did
oppose the inclusion of the Health Education Authority of
Louisiana (HEAL).
The latter agency had been created in 1 968 to
develop a program to increase the number of trained
medical personnel in the state. Part of HEAL's program
involved the construction of a new medical complex to
be located next to Charity Hospital and the two medical
schools in downtown New Orleans. As an independent
authority, HEAL could acquire land for the medical proj-
ect and also issue revenue bonds to pay for its con-
struction . J
Under the original arrangement, Tulane, LSU, and
Charity Hospital were given equal voice in the affairs of
HEAL. The two medical schools believed that once HEAL
was brought under the umbrella department, the health-
welfare commissioner would become the dominant decision-
making authority. The schools warned that they were
prepared to leave the HEAL project if the agency were con-
solidated under DHSRS. Tulane went so far as to publi-
cize plans for the construction of a separate teaching
hospital run by the university. Although Tulane did not
actually threaten to withdraw its medical personnel from
Charity Hospital, the clear implication was that this
5^
might happen if HEAL were included in the consolidation.
Others argued that HEAL was primarily an educa-
tion agency and did not belong in a department that was
service oriented. The chairman of HEAL contended that as
a state agency, HEAL would no longer be able to acquire
land or sell revenue bonds. He claimed that if this
happened, it would doom the planned medical complex. It-
was also claimed by HEAL's supporters that money from
both the federal government and private foundations
would be jeopardized by the consolidation.
Supporters of the reorganization argued that the
exclusion of HEAL from the consolidated department would
defeat the purpose of the consolidation, i.e., to end
the fragmentation in the state's health and welfare sys-
tem. Dr. Charles Mary, the director of Charity Hospital
in New Orleans and one of the key supporters of the re-
organization, argued that HEAL could ultimately become
the chief planning agency for the entire state if it
were included under the umbrella department. Dr. Mary
also suggested that if an exception were made for one
agency and one set of interests, then other agencies
and other interests would push for similar exclusions.
If that happened, there would be little left to consol-
56idate
.
Given the opposition to portions of his plan,
Governor Edwards had little to gain and much to lose by
fighting to the bitter end. Since this was only his
first legislative session, it would make no sense to
alienate key members of the legislature. These legisla-
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tors would be needed to support other legislation Edwards
wanted passed. HEAL was a good example of an area where
the governor could afford to compromise. HEAL was im-
portant to the New Orleans area. Tulane and LSU had
already announced their opposition to the inclusion of
HEAL in the umbrella department. The two daily news-
papers in New Orleans had editorially opposed the inclu-
sion of HEAL, and most of the Orleans parish delegation
to the legislature was committed to fight for HEAL's ex-
clusion from the reorganization. Because the governor
needed the votes of the Orleans delegation on other
matters he considered important, it was prudent for
Governor Edwards to compromise on the HEAL matter.
Another factor in the governor's reluctance to
pursue the reorganization struggle was his growing com-
mitment to the adoption of a new state constitution.
Midway through the legislative session, it was apparent
that the most important legislative act in the governor's
mind was the call for a constitutional convention in
1973. Governor Edwards was particularly concerned about
the content of that call (i.e., procedures for delegate
selection, the agenda of the convention, etc), and he was
unwilling to jeopardize what he obviously thought would
be the most important achievement of his first term. In
the end, the governor decided not to fight for a reorgan-
ization plan which he himself admitted was limited.
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Since the constitutional agencies would have to be dealt
with at the convention, it made sense to put off a re-
organization struggle until that time. Therefore,
Governor Edwards backed away from the controversial
aspects of his reorganization plan. The result was
that the only significant reorganization passed during
the 1972 legislative session was the health-welfare
consolidation minus the HEAL agency.
The Department of Health, Social
and Rehabilitation Services
Agencies Included In the consolidation . With the ex-
ception of HEAL which was finally removed from the con-
solidation bill, the health-welfare reorganization
57passed as Governor Edwards wanted. The major depart-
ments included in the new umbrella department were:
1-The State Department of Hospitals and the
State Hospital Board
2-The Board of Administrators of Charity Hospital
of Louisiana at New Orleans
3-The Board of Directors of Confederate Memorial
Medical Center
4-The Department of Health and the State Board
of Health
5-The State Department of Public Welfare and the
State Board of Public Welfare
The largest of the organizational units included
in the consolidation was the State Department of Hospi-
tals. It was headed by a director who was appointed by
the governor. The director managed the administrative
affairs of the department and also appointed the heads o
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the departmental institutions. The Hospital Department
had a fifteen member board which was also appointed by
the governor. That board was supposed to be responsi-
ble for formulating the policies and regulations govern-
ing the institutions and programs operated by the depart-
ment. In practice though, the board had very little
S8
authority
.
The State Department of Hospitals operated eight
general care hospitals, one tuberculosis hospital and one
tuberculosis clinic, three mental hospitals, five mental
health community centers, fourteen guidance centers, one
geriatric hospital, and eight schools for the mentally
retarded. The range of the department's programs
covered the entire state. In those rural parishes where
there was no state hospital, the department provided free
ambulance service so that patients could be brought to
one of the other state hospitals where the proper care
could be obtained. ^9 With the increased participation
of the federal government in the purchase of medical
care, the department had also begun a program to purchase
medical care for the indigent from private medical care
facilities .
^
Included under the new umbrella department were
the state's largest public hospitals: Charity Hospital at
New Orleans and Confederate Memorial Medical Center in
Shreveport. These two hospitals were operated by their
own independent boards and were not subject to the State
Department of Hospitals. Charity Hospital was governed
by a Board of Administrators composed of seventeen mem-
bers, and Confederate Memorial was governed by a thirteen
member Board of Directors. The Confederate Memorial
Board chose its own hospital director; while the gover-
nor chose the director of Charity Hospital. The gover-
nor also chose the members of both of the hospital boards.
Under the terms of the consolidation, both of these hospi-
tals and their boards would be brought under the control
6
1
of the new health-welfare umbrella department.
The fourth major department included in the con-
solidation was the Department of Health. This department
was responsible for controlling the spread of contagious
diseases, enforcing the state's sanitary codes, providing
preventive care for expectant mothers and children, and
collecting the state's vital statistics. In addition,
the department operated health units in sixty parishes,
public health laboratories, and clinics for crippled
children .
^
The department was run by the State Board of
Health. This board consisted of a president and eight
other members who were all appointed by the governor
for eight year staggered terms. The board was formally
responsible for making regulations and policy for the
department. The president of the board also served as
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the director of the department
.
6 3
The fifth major department included in the con-
solidation was the State Department of Public Welfare.
Like the other major departments included in this con-
solidation, it too possessed a board, the State Board
of Public Welfare. The board was formally responsible
for setting overall policies governing the department
and for appointing the commissioner of public welfare.
The latter functioned as the chief executive officer of
the department. The responsibilities of the department
included the administration of the state's public assist-
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ance programs.
Powers and functions of the new department
.
During the
reorganization debate, there was considerable discussion
about the mission of the new department. This was an
important question in light of recent developments to-
ward the integration of the human services both at the
state and local levels. Proponents of the Louisiana
reorganization had argued that the consolidation would
result in: the creation of a new health-welfare agency
which would be capable of identifying those citizens in
need of social services, establishing a list of priority
services, and efficiently delivering those services to
the needy. 65 This description sounds very similar to
HEW's definition of services integration.
66 Based on
this, one might be led to conclude that services inte-
gration, and not consolidation, is the mission of the new
umbrella department. This is not the case, however.
The final draft of the Louisiana reorganization bill
omits the two key elements of an integrated CHRA: the
divorce of program develooment from services delivery
and the creation of a regional services delivery net-
work. 67
The reorganization bill created eight division
within the umbrella department:
1- Social, Human and Rehabilitative Services
2-Health, Maintenance and Ambulatory Services
3-Hospitals
^-Income Maintenance
5-Mental Health
6-Charity Hospital at New Orleans
7-Adminlstration and Planning Services
8-Education and Research""
The first six divisions correspond to the old program units
(even to the retention of Charity Hospital as a separate
entity), and the last two divisions were supposed to pro-
vide management tools for the new health-welfare commis-
sioner .
With so many agencies brought under the depart-
ment, it was necessary to assure that the commissioner
would actually be able to coordinate the separate units.
The reorganization bill provided that the commissioner
would be the executive officer of the department. He
would be responsible for "the administration, control
and operation of the functions, programs, and affairs
of the department." 69 The commissioner was given power
92
to make all the rules governing the department, to appoint
advisory commissions, to conduct studies and investiga-
tions, to hold hearings, and to restructure the internal
divisions of the department. 70 The latter may be par-
ticularly important since it suggests that at some
time in the future, the commissioner would have the power
to reorient the department toward the services integration
concept. Moreover, he would be able to accomplish this
without having to go back to the legislature for its
approval
.
The commissioner is appointed by the governor
and serves at his pleasure. Although the deputy commis-
sioner is appointed by the commissioner, the heads of
the eight departmental divisions are appointed by the
governor upon the commissioner's recommendation. The
reorganization bill also establishes a fifteen member
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Board of Health, Social, and Rehabilitation Services.
During the reorganization debate, many people had called
for the creation of a board with sole responsibility
for the operations of the department. However, in the
final draft of the reorganization bill, the board is
clearly made subordinate to the commissioner in health-
welfare policy matters. The role of the board is to
serve as adviser to both the governor and the commissioner.
Transition phase . Since the reorganization bill passed
the legislature on July 1, 1972 and would not go into
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effect until January 1, 1973, there was an interval of
six months with which to prepare for the transition.
The legislation specified steps which the agencies were
required to take prior to the effective date of the act.
By September 15, 1972, the agencies were required to
submit to the governor, the commissioner of administra-
tion, and the new health-welfare commissioner designate
a list of personnel, salaries, and job descriptions; an
inventory of office furniture and equipment; all financial
and bookkeeping records; and a summary of all floor space
being used by the agencies. This information was supposed
to be translated into a "transition plan for consolida-
tion" which had to be submitted to the governor and the
commissioner of administration by November 1, 1972. That
plan was supposed to detail how the new health-welfare
commissioner proposed to merge the component parts into
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one department .
'
The final phase of the transition was completed
when Governor Edwards named Dr. Charles Mary to head the
new umbrella department. Dr. Mary had been one of the
prime movers behind the consolidation concept; thus his
aims could be expected to coincide with those of the
governor. After his appointment, Dr. Mary indicated
that his initial efforts would be aimed at eliminating
the duplication and competition for the human resources
dollar which existed under the state's unreformed health-
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welfare system. 73
Cone lusions
As this chapter has noted, Louisiana has not been
a very hospitable environment for administrative reorgan-
ization. The comprehensive reorganization attempted by
the reform governor Sam Jones failed when the state
supreme court invalidated first the amendment and then
the state statute which had established the reorganiza-
tion. For the next thirty-two years, there was little
reorganization in the state.
This chapter has offered the suggestion that one
reason for the lack of reorganization during this period
lies in the failure of the governors to support reorgan-
ization plans. In most of the other states, the record
shows that reorganization proposals have been supported
by the governor because they will increase gubernatorial
power over the state policy-making system. The fact is
that the Louisiana governor does not need this assistance.
A case could even be made that the Louisiana governor
could lose since reorganization might take away some of
his patronage appointments and make it easier for the
state legislature to participate in decision-making.
Conditions during the 1971-72 election campaign
were very similar to those in 19^0 when the first com-
prehensive proposal was made. Political corruption and
voter unrest were evident. The candidates running in
the 1971-72 election camoaign proposed numerous reforms
for state government. One of those candidates, Congress-
man Edwin Edwards, proposed reorganization as well as
major constitutional revision.
Edwards was elected, and to a great many people's
surprise, he made good his promise to propose administra-
tive reform and constitutional revision. The Edwards re-
organization was comprehensive and also very controver-
sial in some aspects. In the final analysis, Edwards got
very little of his reorganization plan passed by the
legislature. He did manage to secure the passage of
legislation consolidating the state's fifty-nine health-
welfare agencies. However, even that legislation was
a compromise since the governor was forced to drop plans
to include HEAL in the umbrella department. The health-
welfare legislation did provide for a transition phase,
but a closer examination of it shows that this transition
was limited to an inventory of equipment and the trans-
fer of records to the commissioner's office. It may
have been an omen that the legislation did not provide
for an inventory of programs and agency goals. It would
certainly seem that any new department head of such a
large agency could have made good use of such an inven-
tory !
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF THE REORGANIZATION ON AGENCY
STRUCTURES, DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES,
AMD PERSONNEL
Introduction
Up to this point, this study has focused solely on
the factors surrounding the consolidation of the fifty-
nine health and welfare agencies under the new umbrella
department. The purpose of the next three chapters is
to examine what has happened since the reorganization
officially went into effect on January 1, 1973- Was that
reorganization a success or a failure? Has it achieved
the monetary savings predicted by Governor Edwards? Has
it improved the delivery of health and welfare services
to Louisiana's citizens? Or, is this yet another reorgan-
ization attempt that must be consigned to the list of
failures
.
The task of evaluating the success or failure of
a reorganization is not an easy one. In his book on state
reorganization, Frederick Mosher suggests two criteria
for judging the effectiveness of a reorganization. 1 The
first criterion is structural effectiveness. Mosher ex-
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plains that a reorganization can be classified as struc-
turally effective if the actual formal organization struc-
tures, the allocation of power within the organization,
the distribution of organization functions, and the in-
ternal relationships within the organization are modi-
fied in accord with the intent of the reorganization
plan. By this measure, the twelve reorganizations in-
cluded in Mosher's book had some measure of structural
effectiveness. However, using Mosher's second criterion,
substantive effectiveness
, those twelve reorganizations
were less effective. Substantive effectiveness involves
"the appraisal of results against the criteria implicit
o
in the statement of reorganization goals.' When the
goals are simple and specifically stated and where results
can be objectively measured, an appraisal of substantive
effectiveness can be made. The problem, though, is that
these conditions are not always present in a particular
reorganization
.
Mosher lists four of the most persistent problems
in evaluating reorganization. The first involves the de-
termination of reorganization goals against which the imple-
mented reorganization can be measured. 3 The difficulty
here lies in the fact that different political actors may
have different goals they wish to achieve through reorgan-
ization. Against which should the implemented reorgan-
ization be measured? Moreover, it is sometimes difficult
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to determine the degree of commitment to the reorganiza-
tion's goals. For example, when Governor Edwards pre-
dicted monetary savings if his reorganization plan was
adopted, was he actually committing his administration
to the realization of these economies? Or, was he only
using the predicted savings as a public relations gim-
mick designed to build political support for his plan?
A second problem arises over the assessment of
the results of the reorganization
.
^ The participants in
the original reorganization decision are most likely to
view the reorganization's results favorably. Therefore,
one should be cautious in obtaining evaluative state-
ments from the reorganization's participants. It will
be necessary to balance their statements with more objec-
tive measures such as: budget totals, number of clients
served, type of services offered, and level of services.
A third problem involves the "cost" of a reorgan-
ization. It is not just a question of how much money
must be spent implementing the reorganization. One must
also assess the cost in terms of such factors as: em-
ployee morale, agency output, and disruption of agency
routines. In the long run, the latter may be more signi-
ficant in assessing the true impact of a reorganization
than either direct monetary costs or savings.
Finally, there is the problem of time.
6 Mosher
points out that major organizational changes are not nec-
essarily immediately visible to outside observers. Mosher'
point is that the gradual nature of organizational change
requires the researcher to employ a longer time period for
his analysis. If the researcher does not use the longer
time period, the likelihood is that his analysis will re-
veal only a partial picture of the impact of organiza-
tional change.
Given the complexity of reorganizing a large
agency or a large group of agencies, it seems likely that
the impact of a reorganization might also be minimal at
the outset of its official adoption. It may be, as Mosher
suggests, that the implementation phase of a reorganiza-
tion will go on long after the official effective date
has passed. During that phase, the task of achieving
the reorganization's goals is complicated by personnel
problems in the recently reorganized agencies, by the
changing needs of clients served by the agencies, and by
changes in political-administrative relationships.
Using a longer period of time for the analysis should
allow a more thorough assessment of the reorganization's
impact as well as these unforseen occurrences.
Integration of Agency Structures
The purpose of Chapters Three and Five is to de-
termine the effectiveness of the 1973 reorganization
using the criteria established by Mosher. The present
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chapter assesses the structural effectiveness of the re-
organization. It will focus on organizational structures,
decision-making procedures, and agency personnel.
One of the first effects one looks for in judging
the impact of a reorganization is the degree to which
governmental structures have actually been changed by
the adoption of the reorganization plan. The tradition-
al reorganization literature suggests that one result
of a reorganization is the integration of organizational
7
structures. It suggests that it is not enough for a
reorganization to accomplish "bureau shuffling," i.e.,
the shifting of agencies on the organization chart with-
out any accompanying effort to integrate the internal
structures of the affected agencies. The literature
suggests that reorganization should also include an at-
tempt to integrate the previously independent agencies
into a single new departmental structure. Presumably,
this would include an effort to eliminate separate
budget, finance, and accounting units. In their place
would be a single unit which would perform all the manage-
g
ment functions for the reorganized department.
How well does the 1973 Louisiana reorganization
conform to this model? A close examination shows that
there was a great deal of bureau shuffling but no immedi-
ate attempt to fuse the fifty-nine separate units into
one large department. One need look no further than the
legislation which created the Louisiana Health, Social
and Rehabilitation Services Administration (hereafter,
abbreviated LHSRSA) to see what little integration
was initially accomplished.^
That legislation stated that the fifty-nine agen-
cies, boards and commissions were "merged and consoli-
dated," and it even specified the separate divisions
that were to comprise the new department. However, the
legislation did not state explicitly that those agencies
were to be abolished or terminated once the reorganiza-
tion took effect. As a result, the old structures
still legally existed alongside the new structures.
The old Department of Public Welfare still legally
existed within the Division of Income Maintenance; the
Department of Hospitals could be found within the new
Division of Hospitals; the Department of Public Health
could be found within the new Division of Health, Main-
tenance and Ambulatory Services; and Charity Hospital
at New Orleans could still be found within the new
Division of Charity Hospital at New Orleans.
The continued separation of Charity Hospital at
New Orleans from the administration of the other state
general care hospitals also indicates what little inte-
gration was actually intended by the enabling legisla-
tion. Had there been a serious effort to integrate
fully the organizational structures of the merged agencies,
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Charity Hospital would certainly have been consolidated
with the other state hospitals under the Division of Hos-
pitals in LHSRSA
.
Yet Charity Hospital remained a separ-
ate organizational entity even after the reorganization
went into effect. This meant that Charity retained its
own Director, budget and accounting units, purchasing
unit, and personnel unit. One must therefore conclude
that the term umbrella was a very accurate description
of LHSRSA in 1973- Like an umbrella, LHSRSA provided
only a superficial covering over the separate organiza-
tional entities which comprised it.
One aspect of the 1973 reorganization which may
eventually assist in achieving the goal of integration
was granting the LHSRSA commissioner the authority to
"merge, consolidate, rearrange, create or establish..."
the divisions within the consolidated department. 11
This seemed to indicate that if it were ever politically
and administratively feasible, the commissioner of LHSRSA
would have the necessary power to complete the full inte-
gration of the department. Indeed, the record shows
that in the five years since the department's creation,
there have been several changes affecting the internal
structures of LHSRSA.
Some have been just cosmetic changes. For ex-
ample, four of the original divisions of LHSRSA under-
went name changes, and in 197*1, the name of the umbrella
department was itself changed to a more manageable title -
the Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration. 12
Also in 197^, a new Division of Youth Services was created
1
3
by legislative act. J This division was given the respon-
sibility for coordinating and planning the services and
resources available to juvenile delinquents. It is inter-
esting to note that during the legislative debate on
this bill there was considerable discussion of the merits
of including the youth correctional institutions (then
housed in the Department of Corrections with all of the
state's adult correctional facilities) in the new LHSRSA
division. While this proposal was subsequently rejected,
the creation of the Youth Services Division plus the cre-
ation of the Division of Rehabilitation Services in 1976
may indicate that Louisiana is moving toward the type of
comprehensive human resources agency described in HEW and
14
Council of State Governments publications.
The most important changes, however, have come
about in the disposition of the so-called housekeeping
15
functions of the umbrella department. J Past reorganiza-
tions have demonstrated that the integration and adequate
financial support of a central housekeeping division is
an essential factor in achieving complete integration of
a reorganized department.
16 Unless the head of the con-
solidated department has management tools at his disposal,
he cannot hope to control the many separate agencies with-
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in his department. These management tools must include
some or all of the following: budgeting, accounting, per-
sonnel, central purchasing, and central planning.
Under the 1973 reorganization, the umbrella de-
partment was given two divisions which conceivably could
have housed all of the management functions of the depart-
ment. The first, the Division of Education and Research,
never became operative. The second, the Division of Ad-
ministration and Planning, has become an important tool
of the LHSRSA commissioners. The first commissioner, Dr.
Charles Mary, did very little with the division since he
was so often embroiled in political disputes with the
17governor and the commissioner of administration. The
second commissioner, Dr. William Stewart (197^-1977) has
accomplished considerable integration of the department's
management functions.
In 1975, Dr. Stewart began transferring the separ-
ate budget functions from the operating divisions to the
1
8
Division of Management (the name was changed in 1975).
Most of these transfers initially came from the Division
of Family Services and the Hospital Division. Somewhat
later, the Division of Management also developed a Data
Processing section, and this section has been gradually
assuming responsibility for most of the data processing
19
needs of the department.
The integration process may have been hastened by
Ill
a series of scandals at the huge Charity Hospital complex
in New Orleans. Throughout 1973 and 197*1, there were con-
stant revelations of equipment theft, mismanagement in
food purchasing, and numerous unexplained drug losses.
These revelations culminated with a surprise inspection
during 1975 by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
20Hospitals. As a result of that surprise inspection,
Charity's accreditation was revoked. The latter action
was the last straw for Governor Edwards since he feared
that loss of accreditation would cause Charity Hospital
to lose federal Medicare and Medicaid funds. Edwards
directed his commissioner of administration, Charles
Roemer, to find out what was happening at Charity Hospi-
tal and to make recommendations on how to solve Charity's
21problems
.
This involvement, however, only complicated
matters for Dr. Stewart. Still new to the commissioner's
job and with very little consolidation already accom-
plished, he was faced with a dilemma. How could he get
information on what was going on at Charity if the people
at Charity did not know themselves? Were the missing
drugs actually stolen? Or, were they only unaccounted for
because of archaic accounting procedures at the hospital?
As long as the commissioner could not give the answers,
he could be sure that the governor and Mr. Roemer would
continue to be involved with Charity's problems. There-
112
fore, if Dr. Stewart was going to free himself from this
outside "help," he needed to build up the auditing and
data processing functions of the Division of Management,.
Evidence of Dr. Stewart's support for management
activities can be seen in the fact that when Dr. Stewart
became commissioner in 197*1, the division was budgeted
only $2.8 million and 215 positions for administrative
, , 22
activities. By the time Dr. Stewart left office in
1977, the division was budgeted $18.3 million and 716
2 3positions for administrative activities. Dr. Stewart's
successor, Dr. William Cherry, seems to be following a
similar course. For his first full budget year, fiscal
year 1978-1979, Dr. Cherry has requested that the division
24be granted a budget of $22.5 million and 1039 positions.
Another area in which the effect of reorganization
might be felt lies in the area of agency Ideology. Anthony
Downs has defined this as:
a verbal image of that portion of the good society
relevant to the functions of the particular bureau
concerned, plus the chief means of constructing that
port ion . ^5
In other words, an agency's ideology expresses the poli-
cy objectives that it wishes to accomplish. This ideol-
ogy does not necessarily provide an accurate description
of what the agency does. Downs refers to it as an "ide-
alized version... tailored to act as a public relations
2 6
vehicle for them.
"
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Through its ideology, an agency is able to pro-
ject its objectives to employees as well as to the outside
political environment. Downs explains that given the
scarcity of available resources and the great amount of
data confronting decision-makers, an agency's ideology
often serves to influence decision-makers to support a
particular agency's objectives. 2 ^
Downs also notes that bureaucratic agencies com-
pete fiercely to distribute favorable images of their work
with the public in the hope that their programs will re-
? 8
ceive public support. Two examples of this are the
FBI and the United States Marine Corps. The FBI has for
years carefully cultivated the image of crimefighter and
protector against communist subversion. The Marine Corps
has built its image by emphasizing its military prepared-
ness and by stressing that the Marines are always the first
American military unit to see combat action.
For those inside an agency, ideology serves an
important function. It gives employees a sense of identi-
ty with the agency's mission and also provides the secur-
ity of being a member of a group. In his case study of
the United States Forest Service, Herbert Kaufman des-
cribes the Forest Service ideology that has developed
over the years. 2 9 Agency members have a sense of belong-
ing to an elite group. Their training in forestry schools,
their unique uniforms, their separate personnel system,
Ili4
and the isolation of their field work set them apart from
the other employees of the federal government.
Thus ideology is an important factor in an agen-
cy's communications with it environment and in its rela-
tionships with its employees. What happens, though, when
a consolidation takes place? One might surmise that the
consolidated department would attempt to submerge the
separate identities of the previously independent agen-
cies and to replace them with the new identity of the con-
solidated department. It would seem that as long as the
subunits retain separate identities this poses a threat
to the consolidated department's ability to integrate the
functions and programs of the reorganized agencies. After
all, if a subunit retains a separate identity with legis-
lators and interest groups, there exists the possibility
that it could go over the department head in order to
appeal budget or program cuts. Perhaps the fact that a
subunit is able to retain its own separate identity
may encourage opponents of the original consolidation
plan to continue their battle to defeat the goals of the
consolidation
.
In the case of the Louisiana consolidation, each
of the reorganized agencies retained its own identity
after the consolidation went into effect. For instance,
if a person was a client of Charity Hospital at New
Orleans prior to the consolidation, he continued to be
served by that agency after the consolidation went into
effect. For that person, the reorganization meant very
little. In fact, the average user of Charity's services
was probably not even aware that the hospital was now
part of a large umbrella department.
Of course, one could argue that the fact that
Charity Hospital retained its same title accounted for
its continued separate identity. However, it should be
pointed out that other departments also retained their
separate identities despite formal name changes. The
Public Welfare Department became the Division of Income
Maintenance under LHSRSA; yet for thousands of welfare
clients, this name change meant very little. Most cli-
ents continued to refer to the new division as the De-
partment of Public Welfare. Even the governor and the
legislature continued to use the old name. The first
Executive Budget issued by the Governor's Office after
the reorganization contained the following heading for
the welfare budget:
Division of Income Maintenance
Department of Public Welfare31
In retrospect, it should not have been that sur-
prising to discover that the Louisiana umbrella depart-
ment has had problems developing an identity of its own.
Given the lack of integration in the initial consolida-
tion effort plus the existence of well established iden-
tities of several of the reorganized agencies, it would
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have been naive to expect the umbrella department to de-
velop a new Identity immediately. Complicating matters
for the umbrella department was the name chosen for it:
the Louisiana Health, Social and Rehabilitation Services
Administration. Even using its initials, LHSRSA, the
title was awkward and unlikely to inspire anything but
confusion when one attempted to verbalize the depart-
ment's name. It certainly was a lot easier for a person
to state that he was receiving services from the Welfare
Department than it was for him to say (in one breath)
that he was receiving services from the Louisiana Health,
Social and Rehabilitation Services Administration.
Because of the confusion caused by the umbrella
department's name, the Louisiana legislature changed the
title of the department in 197^. The new title was the
Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration
(LHHRA). Yet, even this name has had difficulty catching
on with the public. Ironically it seems that some of
the problems encountered by the department (like the
scandals at Charity and the disagreements between the
commissioner of administration and the first two health-
welfare commissioners) may have contributed to the develop-
ment of a negative image for the department. As a matter
of fact, the initials of the department combined with the
numerous problems it has had since the consolidation went
into effect prompted the chairman of the House Appropri-
ations Committee to proclaim that at long last the um-
brella department was properly named: LA HORROR! 33
In the final analysis, the Louisiana case does
raise some interesting questions about the possible
relationship between structural integration and agency
identity. What would have happened had the umbrella
department been more fully integrated from its incep-
tion? Would it have been able to overcome and submerge
the identities of such well established departments as
Charity Hospital and the Department of Public Health
(both of these departments had been organizational enti-
ties for at least one hundred years)?3^ Could those
agencies have resisted the pressures of a strong, well-
integrated department?
Perhaps the answer is that certain subunits of an
umbrella department will always retain an identity with
specialized interest groups. For example, the Office of
Education within the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare retains a special identity with respect to educa-
tion issues. Whether or not an umbrella department tries
to submerge the identities of its component agencies may
depend on its own degree of integration and also on whether
continued separate identities are perceived as a threat
to the consolidated department. A subunit which goes about
its business without interfering with departmental objec-
tives may not be seen as a threat. However, a controver-
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slal agency or one that balks at orders from the commis-
sioner's office may be seen as a threat. In that event,
it would seem that the consolidated department would make
an intensified effort to submerge the identity of the
offending subunit.
Decision-Making in the Umbrella Department
One of the biggest problems encountered in the
consolidation of a large group of agencies lies in the
area of decision-making. The head of the consolidated
department is supposed to become the primary decision-
maker for the department. Individual agencies still
participate in formulating decisions; however it is the
department head who now has the final say. With all of
the information funnelled to him, it is presumed that he
is in the best position to determine if any undesirable
program duplication is present. Whenever he finds it,
the department head's job is to eliminate the undesirable
duplication and force the agencies to coordinate their
activities. The key ingredients in this becoming a real-
ity are that the department head be given full authority
over component agencies, adequate management tools, and
support of the chief executive who appointed him.
Of course, the ideal and the reality are often
contradictory. What frequently happens is that the head
of the consolidated department becomes little more than
a figure head. This is especially true if the component
agencies are well established with strong ties to clients
and legislators. In the latter cases, agencies are able
to resist the coordinative efforts of the new department
head. They go about their normal routines as if the re-
organization had never taken place.
Since the Louisiana reorganization involved such
a large number of agencies with established routines and
strong political allies, it might have been expected that
the LHSRSA commissioner would have difficulty controlling
the department. Nevertheless, it should be remembered
that the reorganization legislation did provide the basis
for establishing a strong commissioner. That legislation
stated that the commissioner would be:
the executive and administrative officer of the state
department of health, social and rehabilitation serv-
ices. He shall be responsible for the administration,
control and operation of the functions, programs and
affairs of the department and the policies with respect
thereto and of all institutions and facilities there-
of. 35
In addition, the legislation stated that the commissioner
was to advise the governor on health-welfare issues, and
it gave the LHSRSA commissioner the authority to hold
hearings, conduct investigations, and make rules govern-
ing the department. Coupled with his authority to merge
and consolidate divisions, this legislation seemed to
give the LHSRSA commissioner adequate authority to gov-
ern the umbrella department.
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The problem with this is that in practice the
LHSRSA commissioners have had to contend with political
and administrative problems that have frequently over-
whelmed them. This seems to be why the first commission-
er, Dr. Charles Mary, did not have as great an impact on
departmental decision-making as one might have expected.
Dr. Mary had been one of the prime movers behind
the consolidation concept. 36 Although he had not been a
political supporter of Edwin Edwards during the guber-
natorial election, his selection as the first LHSRSA com-
missioner certainly indicated that he had the governor's
confidence. Because of his administrative experience as
head of Charity Hospital at New Orleans, most observers
viewed Dr. Mary as the ideal choice to be the first LHSRSA
commissioner
.
Dr. Mary was designated commissioner of LHSRSA in
November, 1972. The reorganization went into effect on
January 1, 1973; however, within ten months, Dr. Mary had
37
become the center of a major political controversy. 3 '
In June of 1973, Governor Edwards had approved a
salary hike for the LHSRSA commissioner. The press immedi-
ately questioned the advisability of giving Dr. Mary an
increase to $55,000 a year. Governor Edwards justified
this increase on the grounds that Dr. Mary had assumed the
duties of the recently resigned state health officer. The
governor reasoned that the state was actually saving money
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since Dr. Mary was now performing two jobs. 38
Dr. Mary also experienced problems when a legis-
lative audit disclosed that Charity Hospital at New
Orleans had purchased meat at $^.95 a pound and that the
hospital's board members and state legislators often ate
free meals at the hospital. The audit made the point
that while the board members and state legislators were
getting the expensive grades of meat, hospital patients
were being fed a cheaper, lower grade of meat. Because
Dr. Mary had been hospital director while this practice
was going on, he received most of the blame. Legisla-
tors wanted to know how Dr. Mary and the governor could
justify increased appropriations for the umbrella depart-
ment when so much money was being wasted on free meals. 39
Governor Edwards initially defended Dr. Mary and
the umbrella department's policies. He and Dr. Mary ap-
peared together at a press conference to refute the criti-
cisms. They claimed that the practice of giving free meals
to board members and legislators had stopped once Gover-
nor Edwards became governor. They also pointed out that
within only six months of the consolidation the state had
already saved $10 million. This total, according to the
governor and Dr. Mary, consisted of:
$4.7 million which the department returned to the state
general fund tucdqa
$2.0 million in new federal funds generated by LHonbA
$1.3 million saved by encouraging early retirements
and by denying merit increases
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$2.0 million saved in interest rates and overhead
Both the governor and Dr. Mary predicted that further
savings would be realized before the end of the year.^ 0
However the relationship between Governor Edwards
and Dr. Mary had deteriorated before those additional
savings could be achieved. Most of the trouble between
Edwards and Mary stemmed from Dr. Mary's attack on the
Family Health Foundation (abbreviated FHF). The latter
was a private family planning agency with strong ties to
Tulane Medical School. The dean of the medical scnool
was a member of the Family Health Foundation's board
of directors, and the head of FHF, Dr. Joseph Beasley,
was on the Tulane medical faculty.
^
The Family Health Foundation held both federal and
state contracts to deliver birth control and other family
planning services to Louisiana's poor. Apparently, Com-
missioner Mary's interest in FHF contracts began in April,
1973. At that time, a regional HEW official warned him
of certain irregularities in FHF's execution of the con-
tract. The HEW official also informed Dr. Mary that there
would be a federal audit of the manner in which FHF had
executed its federal contract. In September, 1973, after
completion of his own investigation, Dr. Mary announced
at a press conference that the state of Louisiana would
not sign another contract with FHF. With that announce-
ment, Dr. Beasley and other FHF officials complained to
the governor and Commissioner of Administration Charles
Roemer. They intimated that Dr. Mary was professionally
jealous of Dr. Beasley's world-wide reputation as a fam-
ily planning expert. They also charged that Dr. Mary
wanted to take over the family planning program, placing
it under the control of the umbrella department.^ 2
The governor apneared to agree with the FHF argu-
ments. He publicly reprimanded Dr. Mary and stated that
only the governor had the authority to approve or dis-
approve state contracts. Despite an attorney-general's
opinion to the contrary, the governor persisted in his
public statements. Edwards also insisted that he could
find no wrong with FHF, adding that the real problem
seemed to be a personality clash between Commissioner Mary
and Dr. Beasley.^3
In the next seven months, the relationship be-
tween the governor and Dr. Mary deteriorated even further.
There was considerable speculation that Dr. Mary would be
fired. Governor Edwards continued his public criticism
of his LHSRSA commissioner, charging that Dr. Mary had
spent too much time on the FHF matter and not enough time
attending to the imolementat ion of the health-welfare re-
organization. The governor even went so far as to suggest
that Dr. Mary hire a special assistant to help him with the
consolidation. The governor added, however, that Dr.
Mary should be willing to take a voluntary pay cut in
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order to compensate his new assistant.
Matters were not helped by newspaper reports that
the governor's election campaign had received contribu-
tions from FHF and that both the governor and his brother
had taken trips aboard a plane leased to FHF. Eventually
Dr. Mary's position on the FHF matter was vindicated. The
governor was forced to admit that there was much more to
the FHF case than he had at first realized. By that time
though, Dr. Mary's relationship with the governor had
deteriorated to the point where he could no longer be
effective as LHSRSA commissioner. Dr. Mary resigned
his position on April 5, 197^1.^5
In the final analysis, Governor Edwards was prob-
ably correct in his assertion that Dr. Mary had spent too
much of his time on the FHF matter. Once embroiled in a
public dispute with the governor, Dr. Mary had little time
left for departmental concerns. Yet, before the dispute
came to occupy so much of his time, Dr. Mary took some
administrative actions which illustrated the potential
for the commissioner in decision-making matters affecting
the department.
To begin with, Dr. Mary transferred funds from
other programs to the departmental program which tested
children for hearing defects. The hearing program's
funds had expired before the end of the fiscal year.
If Dr. Mary had not taken his prompt action, approxi-
mately 142 children would have gone without hearing aids
until a new budget was approved by the legislature. Dr.
Mary again took positive action when the food stamp pro-
gram experienced a backlog of applications. Dr. Mary's
administrative response was to transfer employees from
other divisions to the Division of Income Maintenance
which had responsibility for the program. As a result,
the backlog was eliminated in only ten working days.
During his tenure as commissioner, Dr. Mary also insti-
tuted central purchasing for hospital equipment and
supplies, saving the state an estimated $500,000.
Overall, Dr. Mary's success as commissioner was
limited by his preoccupation with the FHF problem.
Nevertheless, Dr. Mary's tenure demonstrated that the
concept of health-welfare consolidation could work.
Using a consolidated department, the state could save
money, respond more quickly to administrative problems,
and deliver the needed health and welfare services in an
efficient manner. It would remain for the next commis-
sioner, though, to cope with all of the implementation
problems which Dr. Mary never solved.
Compared to Dr. Mary's term, the second commis-
sioner's was relatively calm. Dr. William Stewart a-
chieved more consolidation and increased still further
the role of the commissioner in departmental decision-
making. As previously indicated, Dr. Stewart's support
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for the consolidation of management functions strengthened
the commissioner. This action forced component divisions
within LHSRSA to submit their budget requests to the
Division of Management where its auditors could evalu-
ate them against past performances.^
Like his predecessor, Dr. Stewart was also
forced to spend much of his time on the problems of
Charity Hospital and the Family Health Foundation; how-
ever, other matters soon occupied part of his time.
The state was ordered by a federal court to place its
emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children in
state institutions. For years Louisiana had been housing
them in Texas institutions. After it was shown that those
Texas institutions often provided substandard and even in-
humane care, the federal court ordered the state to place
those children in licensed facilities within the state.
That court order forced the commissioner to become more
involved with the Divisions of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation. This involvement eventually resulted in
increased appropriations for the two divisions and also
in a general upgrading of many institutions run by those
divisions .
^
While the commissioner's role in the department
has been expanding, that of the governor and the commis-
sioner of administration has also increased. The numerous
problems confronting the umbrella department have forced
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Governor Edwards and Commissioner of Administration Charles
Roemer to take an active role in departmental matters. ^9
This has often produced favorable results in terms of in-
creased appropriations and approval of deficit spending
for the department, but it has no doubt also been a
source of irritation for the commissioner of the um-
brella department. He has been faced with the prospect
of having the governor and Mr. Roemer constantly looking
over his shoulder.
An example which illustrates this frustration oc-
curred in the firing of two hospital directors at Charity
Hospital. When Dr. Stewart came into office, one of his
immediate goals was to have Charity Hospital sign a formal
affiliation agreement with Tulane and LSU medical schools.
The two medical schools felt that it was time for such a
formal agreement, but Charity's director opposed the
agreement. He argued that the two medical schools were
trying to take over the hospital. He also claimed that
if the affiliation agreement were signed, patient care
would be sacrificed. He claimed that the primary goal
of Charity Hospital would henceforth be the education of
new doctors
.
When the hospital director refused a direct order
from Dr. Stewart to sign the affiliation agreement, he was
promptly fired and replaced with someone who promised to
carry out the commissioner's orders. That new director,
Lee Frazier, was not a doctor. He was, however, a pro-
fessionally trained hospital administrator and also the
first black to hold so high a position in Louisiana
government.51 i n September, 1976, Mr. Frazier was forced
to resign because of a dispute with Commissioner of Ad-
ministration Charles Roemer. The latter felt that Mr.
Frazier had been uncooperative with the management people
Roemer had assigned to Charity Hospital. Apparently
piqued by this interference with his authority, Dr.
Stewart rehired Lee Frazier as a special assistant to
the LHSRSA commissioner .
5
2 Although this was only a
minor incident, it seems to indicate that Dr. Stewart
did indeed resent "outside" interference from the gover-
nor and Mr. Roemer.
In spite of the setbacks, the commissioner's au-
thority over the umbrella department has gradually in-
creased. Each commissioner has become more involved in
policy matters affecting the different divisions of the
department. To some extent, the interest of the commis-
sioner in a particular division seems to be in direct pro-
portion to the degree of publicity given its problems.
Since Charity Hospital has given the commissioner more
trouble than the other divisions, the LHSRSA commission-
er has been forced to devote much of his time to solving
the hospital's problems. As other problems developed,
the commissioner has given his time to other divisions.
The result has been a steady, if slow, increase in the
commissioner's influence over all aspects of decision-
making in the umbrella department. With this increase,
there has been a corresponding decrease in the ability
of the individual component agencies to make decisions
independent of the commissioner.
Given Governor Edward's personal political in-
vestment in the success of the umbrella department plus
the large investment of the state's resources, it might be
expected that Edwards and Commissioner Roemer will main-
tain their close surveilance of the department. VJhen
major problems arise (and, to some extent, Governor
Edwards has defined "major" problems as those which re-
ceive considerable and adverse media interest), the
governor and his commissioner of administration will in-
ject themselves in running the department. Even though
this causes friction between the LHSRSA commissioner
and his political superiors, the situation is not likely
to change until the problems of the department occupy
fewer newspaper headlines. It must be remembered that
Governor Edwards has a large political investment in
the consolidation. He has supported the department's
huge budget requests, but he also expects some political
return for his investment . 53
Even though he appeared at times to resent the
governor's interest, Dr. William Stewart seemed aware of
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these political realities. One suspects that his frequent
clashes with Charles Roemer were Dr. Stewart's way of
diverting his annoyance away from the governor. Even
though Roemer obviously represents the governor in his
dealings with the umbrella department, it was still
convenient for Dr. Stewart to depict Roemer as the
"heavy." One further suspects that Governor Edwards
purposely uses Charles Roemer in this capacity with
respect to all other state administrators under the
governor's authority. This strategy allows the gover-
nor his input to the various departments; yet it also
permits the departments to assert their independence
by lashing out at the commissioner of administration . 5^
Reorganization's Effect on Agency Personnel
Previous reorganization studies have indicated
that there is frequently employee resistance to massive
consolidation . 55 This stems from their fears about the
unknown effects of reorganization. Employees are not
certain whether their jobs will be secure under the re-
organization. They are also apprehensive that estab-
lished working relationships within the agency and be-
tween the agency and outside political actors will be
adversely affected by the reorganization. For these
reasons, employees sometimes provide the most visible
resistance to reorganization plans. Failing in these
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efforts, employees may resort to "guerilla warfare" as
they try to sabotage the reorganization during the imple-
mentation phase. 56
Based on these observations from other studies,
one might have expected more vigorous opposition from
the employees of agencies affected by the health-welfare
consolidation. In view of Governor Edwards' emphasis on
the savings that would result from the consolidation,
those employees would have been expected to be very
vocal in their opposition to the plan. On the contrary,
the opposition during the adoption stage was minimal.
Perhaps because of the strong support given the plan by
the governor, the state health officer, and the director
of Charity Hospital, the employees might have felt that
it was pointless to oppose the massive consolidation pro-
posal. On the other hand, the employees of the affected
agencies may not have felt threatened by the plan. They
may have felt that the reorganization would amount to
little more than an artificial covering over their agen-
cies. They may also have thought that established agency
routines would not be affected despite what the governor
and his supporters predicted.
The only significant employee opposition to the
reorganization came after the plan went into effect.
Among those agencies scheduled to be consolidated under
LHSRSA's umbrella was the Orleans Parish Health Depart-
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ment.57 Although all of the other parish health units
were under the control and supervision of the State
Health Department, the New Orleans health
-unit had always
been an independent entity. It had never had any formal
organizational ties with the state department. In fact,
it was a charter agency of New Orleans city government.
Also, unlike the other parish health units, the New
Orleans unit was under the city's civil service and was
financed totally by local funding (except for a small
amount of federal funds
After the 1973 reorganization went into effect,
the new umbrella department made formal plans to consoli-
date the Orleans Parish Health Department. The problem
was that the employees of that department did not want to
be brought under the state civil service. Apparently,
the city employees were worried about seniority, job
classification, and pension benefits under the state civil
service system. After the health department's employees
threatened mass resignations, the city's elected officials
decided to support their cause. The New Orleans city
council instructed the city attorney to file suit charg-
ing that the 1972 reorganization legislation was uncon-
stitutional because it violated the city's home rule
charter . 59
As a result, the consolidation of the Orleans Par-
ish health unit was delayed eighteen months while city
officials and representatives from LHSRSA negotiated a
settlement that would be acceptable to the city health
unit's employees. The agreement was finally reached in
August, 1974. Under the terms of that agreement, the
city's health unit would be merged into the umbrella
department. However, the city employees would be given
the option of transferring to the state civil service
or remaining with the city civil service. If they chose
the latter option, they would be transferred to another
city department . 6°
Although there have been other employee related
problems since the reorganization went into effect, it
is not possible to determine the extent to which these
are the direct result of the reorganization. The prob-
lems at Charity Hospital created numerous morale prob-
lems at that large institution. The loss of hospital
accreditation lowered the morale of the young doctors
In training at Charity. Staff physicians were upset at
the rapid turnover of hospital directors and also at the
signing of the affiliation agreement between Charity and
the two medical schools. The staff physicians feared
that Charity would now become primarily a teaching insti
tution and that the quality of patient care would deteri
orate. It is very likely that those staff physicians
were also worried about the security of their jobs in
in the event that Tulane and LSU actually did increase
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their influence over the hospital. Since many of the
staff physicians were not on the Tulane and LSU medical
faculties, there may have been some justification for
their fears. Those fears could only have been increased
when Dr. William Stewart, the LSU medical school chan-
cellor, became the LHSRSA commissioner in 197*1. And, when
Stewart gave the order to sign the affiliation agreement,
it seemed that their worst fear had been realized.
^
1
Morale problems also developed in the Division
of Income Maintenance (formerly the Department of Public
Welfare). Its problems mostly involved the New Orleans
office of the division. That office was beset by a back-
log of welfare applications. In addition, there were
charges that some of the welfare workers in the office
had placed themselves on the welfare rolls. In order
to cut down on the alleged welfare fraud, the division's
director ordered the case workers to make more frequent
home visits, even if it meant going into the city's
housing projects where the crime rate was very high.
Case workers were very upset by these orders and also by
the fact that the division head sent in an outsider to
"clean up" the New Orleans office. Eventually the
problems in that office were relieved when the division
head removed the New Orleans director and replaced her
with someone else who would see to it that the office's
backlog and the welfare fraud were eliminated. Furthermore,
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the division head relented with respect to his order that
case workers had to go into high crime areas. He finally
agreed that welfare workers would only have to go into
those areas if they were accompanied by a police escort. 62
It may well be that greater problems have not
developed because the consolidation has not been shown
to be a threat to employee job security. Before the re-
organization ever went into effect, there was considerable
discussion about possible economies which might result.
It should be noted, though, that there was never any
mention of massive firings or layoffs. On the contrary,
both Governor Edwards and Dr. Mary went out of their way
to assure employees that there would be no such drastic
actions. At the very first meeting of the new depart-
ment's advisory board, Dr. Mary stated:
I want to make it very clear neither the administra-
tion nor the board is going to go into any sort of
massive firings and layoffs. We will use natural
attrition and transfer to we hope reduce the total
table of organization in other actions. ...Other
sections will need strengthening, and personnel
will have to be moved from one area where there is
strength to another where there is not. 63
Later, Dr. Mary announced that the department would also
encourage early retirements in order to get the number of
departmental personnel down to a more manageable level.
As Table 1 shows, the number of employees in the
umbrella department has increased steadily since the re-
organization went into effect. The agencies targeted for
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consolidation were budgeted for 21, 7145 positions in
fiscal year 1972-73. Each year since then, the total
has increased, with the figure reaching almost 27,000
by the 1977-78 fiscal year. Thus, employees appear to
have been correct in assuming that the consolidation
would not threaten job security.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN LHSRSA
Fiscal Agency Governor '
s
Budgeted by
Year Requests Recommen- Legislature
dations
1973-7^ 29,650 22,153 22,484
1974-75 23,813 23,294 25,069
1975-76 29,218 25,130 25,655
1976-77 28,446 26,676 26,458
1977-78 29,107 26,600 26,887
1978-79 28,968 27 ,292 n . a
.
Source: State of Louisiana. Executive Budget , Fiscal
Years 1973-74 through 1978-79-
Conclusions
Using Mosher's criterion, it must be concluded
that the Louisiana reorganization has not been completely
effective from a structural standpoint. The structures
of the independent agencies merged under the umbrella
department were not substantially changed by the initial
reorganization legislation. Whether intentional or not,
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the 1972 reorganization legislation had not specified that
the merged agencies would cease to exist once the reorgan-
ization took effect. This left the old organizational
structures coexisting alongside the new ones.
The umbrella department has had some difficulty
developing a separate identity for itself. Since the
divisions are still roughly divided along old organiza-
tional lines, each has retained its separate identity
for clients and others in the political system. The
umbrella department has begun to establish its own iden-
tity, but this is partly because of the numerous politi-
cal and administrative problems it has encountered since
the reorganization took effect. That identity for many
in Louisiana is a negative one.
Even though the Louisiana reorganization has had
only a limited degree of structural effectiveness, this
has not detracted from the commissioners' efforts to gain
more control over the decision-making procedures in the
new department. Principally because of the efforts of the
second LHSRSA commissioner, Dr. William Stewart, the com-
missioner has increased his authority over the department.
Dr. Stewart supported the growth of the Division of Manage-
ment, and he has used this division in his efforts to gain
control over the operating divisions of the department.
The governor and the commissioner of administra-
tion retain an active interest in the affairs of the urn-
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brella department. As was shown in this chapter, that
interest is primarily the result of the numerous admin-
istrative and political problems which have beset the
new department since the reorganization. As long as
these problems persist, one can predict that Governor
Edwards and Mr. Roemer will maintain more than just a
passing interest in LHSRSA.
Finally, this chapter has shown that the reorgan-
ization did not substantially lower the morale of agency
employees. In large measure, this was due to the efforts
of Governor Edwards and the first LHSRSA commissioner,
Dr. Charles Mary. Both went out of their way to assure
employees that there would be no massive firings or lay-
offs once the reorganization took effect. The loss in
morale that has taken place seems to be the direct re-
sult of other problems (like the mismanagement at Charity
and the alleged fraud in the welfare division) rather than
the result of reorganization. The only major employee
problem which developed directly because of the reorgan-
ization was the problem with the Orleans Parish Health
Department. That, however, involved only one small agen-
cy within LHSRSA' s umbrella.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND
THE HEALTH-WELFARE REORGANIZATION
Introduction
As indicated in Chapter I of this case study, ad-
ministrative agencies often oppose change simply because
they are uncertain how it will affect them. 1 In the case
of a large-scale consolidation, the affected agencies are
afraid that consolidation will result in the erection
of barriers between themselves and the other political
actors in the system. They believe that consolidation
will force them to establish a whole new set of relation-
ships with the political actors in their environment.
In spite of these oft-expressed fears, consolida-
tion at the state level does take place. But the question
remains: Does reorganization produce the results feared by
administrative agencies? While the literature on this par-
ticular aspect of the reorganization issue is sparse, it
suggests that the results are not nearly as detrimental as
those envisioned by the administrative agencies. Francis
Rourke's case study of the consolidation of the federal
employment security program demonstrates that existing
li»5
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patterns of administrative communications can be carried
on despite a formal change on the organization chart. 2
This would tend to suggest that agencies probably do
not have as much to fear from reorganization as they sus-
pect. However, for those proposing reorganizations or
any other major changes in organizational behavior,
Rourke's findings underscore the pitfalls that can arise
during the implementation stage. Lest any reorganiza-
tion proponent think his job over once a legislature ap-
proves a reorganization bill, the Rourke case study
clearly shows that it is in the implementation process
where the success or failure of the reorganization's
goals is determined.
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine
what effect the 1973 reorganization has had on the politi-
cal-administrative relationships in Louisiana. What is
the relationship between the umbrella department and the
other political actors in the state? Has this changed
greatly from the previous situation when the fifty-nine
separate agencies, boards and commissions were inter-
acting with the political-administrative environment?
Governor Edwards, the Commissioner
of Administration and LHSRSA
It is evident to anyone familiar with Louisiana
government that Governor Edwards and his commissioner of
administration are deeply involved in the operation of
the umbrella department. The question is whether this is
the result of the recent reorganization or' the result of
some other factors. In searching for an answer to this
question, it will be necessary to look briefly at recent
Louisiana politics. However, before doing so, it might be
helpful to reexamine the role of the governor with re-
spect to the state bureaucracy.
The greatly expanded state bureaucracy with all
of its complex programs and problems has tended to focus
public attention on the governor's role as manager of
state government. A 1 966 study by Thomas Anton drew a
gloomy picture of the governor as a political novice with
no prior administrative experience and with no special-
ized knowledge of complex policy issues. 3 it is inter-
esting to note that Anton found the governor (Anton's
study focused specifically on the Illinois governor)
keenly aware of his own shortcomings in dealing with the
bureaucracy. Anton noted that the governor tends to con-
centrate his political resources on a particular agency
or policy area (either as a result of personal interest
in the policy area or in response to what the governor
and his staff perceive to be a public crisis). Despite
the governor's attempts to initiate change, he has little
effect on the administrative system. Anton concluded
that the governor's change efforts are actually more
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symbolic than substantive. According to Anton, the real
meaning of the governor's change proposals is to demon-
strate to the system that it cannot get along without him.
A more recent study by Martha Weinberg confirms
many of Anton's observations.^ Weinberg's study covers
the administration of Massachusetts governor Francis
Sargent (1969-197^ ) . She concentrates on Governor
Sargent's relationships with four state agencies: the
Department of Public Welfare, the Department of Public
Works, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, and the
Department of Mental Health.
When Francis Sargent became governor in 1969, he
did not fit the Anton stereotype: no administrative exper-
ience and no knowledge of detailed, technical matters. On
the contrary, Sargent seemed the ideal "manager" type. He
had served as the head of two state agencies: the Depart-
ment of Public Works and the Department of Natural Re-
sources. He had also served as the lieutenant-governor
under Governor John Volpe. With such an extensive admin-
istrative background, one might have guessed that Sargent
would be very interested in administrative matters. This
was not the case however.
Governor Sargent did not consider himself the typi-
cal manager attending to the day-to-day governmental prob-
lems. He described his own approach to management as that
of "managing crises." He preferred to remain apart from
1*19
administrative matters until he or his staff perceived a
crisis. At that point, Sargent would become involved,
sorting through the opposing positions and- choosing what
he though to be the best solution to the problem. It is
interesting to note that Sargent was not a policy ini-
tiator. Given his background, one might have expected
him to take an active role in the policy initiation pro-
cess. Such was not Sargent's style! In fact, Weinberg
suggests that his ability to remain divorced from policy
advocacy probably made it easier for him to play the role
of mediator in times of crises.
5
Finally, Weinberg's study is important because
she points out that not only are there different styles of
gubernatorial management, but there are also different
situations which require a particular style. For in-
stance, an "advocate governor" is required when there is
a need to place particular items on the public agenda.
In that event, the public needs to elect someone who
will take the lead in advocating a certain policy. Some-
times, there is need for a person who "is good at identi-
fying and encouraging the development of technocratic
or bureaucratic issues and who is willing to give them
a prominent place on his agenda." 6 At other times, there
is a need for a person who is capable of responding
quickly to changes in public opinion. Weinberg concludes
that the role of the public is to "recognize that the im-
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portant question to ask about a governor is not 'How good
is he at management?' but instead, 'What kind of manage-
ment needs to be done and what kind of elected manager
does this call for?' "7
As indicated previously, Governor Edwards and
his commissioner of administration have shown a great deal
of attention to the new health-welfare department. To
those familiar with recent Louisiana politics, this in-
volvement may not at first seem unusual. Part of the
legacy left by Huey Long and his followers was a type of
rural liberalism which advocated high governmental ex-
penditures for the benefit of the needy poor.^ With
these increased expenditures, the Longs built a state-
wide system of public hospitals (setting very lenient
eligibility standards for free hospital care), estab-
lished a contract bed program whereby medical services
for the needy could be purchased from private hospitals,
established a state dental program, provided free ambu-
lance service, and established a lenient old age assist-
ance program.
9
The costs of these programs were high. In fiscal
19^8-^9, Governor Earl K. Long allocated 30.9% of the
state's budget to health and welfare programs. 10 By
fiscal 1972-73, the percentage allocated to health and
welfare was 26.^, but the actual dollar figure was
$522 million. 11 This made health-welfare the second most
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expensive program next to public education. During the
1972-73 period, the state spent almost $729 million for
all levels of public education. 12
In spite of these high costs, few politicians
have attacked the Long programs. Like the New Deal pro-
grams of Franklin Roosevelt, the Long social-welfare pro-
grams have become firmly entrenched as legitimate public
programs for state government. For a Louisiana politi-
cian to attack them would amount to political suicide.
Therefore, most politicians feel it is safer to proclaim
their support for the programs. In the case of the anti-
Long candidate Sam Jones, he not only affirmed his sup-
port for the Long programs, but he also promised to in-
crease their benef it s . 3
It would be naive to suggest that the Longs sup-
ported social-welfare programs solely out of a humanistic
commitment. The truth is that these programs were an
important instrument in their ability to maintain control
over state government. It was common practice for the
Long faction to increase old age pension benefits during
an election year. Furthermore, hospital directors were
routinely chosen on the basis of their political loyalty
to the Longs. In 1948, Earl Long asked the state legis-
lature to create boards for each of the state's hospi-
tals. His purpose was solely to increase the patronage
power of the governor. 1 ^
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Still another factor which may partially explain
the Louisiana governor's interest in health and welfare
matters may -be traced to the historical weakness of local
government in this state. State government in Louisiana
has assumed many of the functions usually provided by
local governments in other states. In his study of state
spending, Ira Sharkansky discovered that this situation
is not unique to Louisiana. He found that most low in-
come states tend to rely on state collected revenues to
finance many public services (including health and wel-
fare services). Since local governments in these states
do not have the economic resources to support even a
minimum level of public services, the pattern has been
for local officials to look to state government to
finance a great percentage of public services. J Be-
cause of the governor's dominance over Louisiana govern-
ment, the tendency in this state has been for local
officials to appeal directly to the governor.
Thus, one could conclude with some justification
that it is "normal" for Louisiana governors to become in-
volved in health-welfare matters. The problem with this
conclusion, though, is that Governor Edwards has been
much more involved in this policy area than any of his
recent predecessors. It is possible that his interest is
solely the result of the 1973 reorganization; however, it
is also conceivable that other factors may be responsible.
The first factor has to do with the political
importance of the black vote in recent Louisiana elec-
tions. As already noted in this paper, the black vote
has become an important consideration for any candidate
desiring to put together a winning coalition. 1 ^ It is
quite possible that Edwin Edwards' intense interest in
health-welfare matters stems from his desire to appeal
to black voters. On the other hand, a case could also
be made that it was the governor's personal background
which accounts for his interest in health-welfare matters.
Governor Edwards is from a relatively poor, rural
parish. Having grown up in such surroundings, it might
have been expected that Edwards would have had some first
hand contact with the state's health-welfare system.
This fact was confirmed during the 1971-72 electoral
campaign when Edwards related the story of his first en-
counter with the state's charity hospital system. As
Edwards tells it: as a young boy, Edwards needed medical
treatment which he could not receive in his home parish.
Therefore, Edwards was sent by bus (a free service pro-
vided rural residents in the state) to Charity Hospital
in New Orleans where he received the treatment he needed.
Edwards would conclude this anecdote by stressing that
this personal experience had left him with a deep com-
mitment to the continuation of quality health and welfare
1
7
services provided by the state.
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While all of these factors (personal, political
and historical) explain part of the reason for the gover-
nor's interest in health and welfare matters, they do
not explain his, and Commissioner Roemer's, constant
involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the department.
The only explanation seems to be that the administrative
and political problems arising from the reorganization
have forced Edwards and Roemer to maintain a close super-
vision of LHSRSA. This involvement is made even more
significant in view of the fact that Governor Edwards is
not known to be good at or particularly fond of manage-
ment. Indeed, it has often been said by political ob-
servers in the state that Edwards is more suited to de-
veloping ideas than he is to implementing them. To the
governor's credit, he has surrounded himself with the
management types who can implement his ideas.
Commissioner of Administration Charles Roemer is
the prime example of this. He has often been used by the
governor as a troubleshooter . For example, it was Mr.
Roemer who was sent by the governor to clear up the
problems with the New Orleans Superdome. That stadium
was wracked by political scandal and mismanagement even
before its official opening. Not wanting to interfere
with local politicians who were awarding stadium contracts
on the basis of personal friendship and political loy-
alty, the governor allowed this to continue until it ap-
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peared that the state's reputation and financial status
were in jeopardy. At that point, the governor assigned
Charles Roemer the task of putting the huge stadium com-
plex in order. Roemer responded by bringing in his own
management people from the Division of Administration.
While Roemer never completely solved all of the stadi-
um's financial and management problems, he did at least
bring them under control. Eventually, at Roemer's sug-
gestion, the operation of the stadium was turned over to
a professional management firm. 1 "
Roemer has played much the same role for the gover-
nor with respect to the problems of the umbrella depart-
ment. It was Roemer who was assigned the task of finding
out what was going on at Charity Hospital in New Orleans.
The result was that the hospital's management was substan-
tially improved. Eventually, the hospital also won back
its accreditation. However, if anyone got in Roemer's way
19(as did Charity Hospital's director), he was forced out.
With each new crisis, the governor's and Mr.
Roemer's involvement in LHSRSA's activities has increased.
The governor and Mr. Roemer were drawn into the Family
Health Foundation controversy, the problems with the state
welfare program, the controversy surrounding the signing
of the affiliation agreement between Charity Hospital and
the two medical schools, and the problems with the state's
program for treating emotionally disturbed and mentally
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retarded children. 20 In the long run, this involvement
has probably been greater than LHSRSA's commissioners
would have liked. However, it must be recognized how
much is at stake politically. The department is the
largest in state government, has the second highest
budget, and operates many controversial programs. The
governor first involved himself when he proposed the
consolidation of the state's health and welfare agen-
cies. He has been forced to continue his involvement
because one crisis after another in the department has
demanded his and Roemer's attention. The fact is that
not all of the problems in LHSRSA are major ones. Cer-
tainly, drug thefts in hospitals are quite common and
ordinarily are not important enough to warrant media and
legislative attention. But, when those problems occur
within one of LHSRSA's divisions (e.g., the drug thefts
at Charity Hospital), they seem to take on new proportions.
The chances are that if the same problems occurred in
smaller, less controversial departments, not very much
attention would be drawn to them.
There have been many positive benefits to come
out of the governor's involvement in the umbrella depart-
ment. The governor has publicly committed himself to the
success of the reorganization. This means that he must
support LHSRSA's commissioners, its policies, and its
budget requests. If he does not provide the department
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with enough support and the reorganization subsequently
fails, his critics will surely point to this as the
reason
.
Nowhere is the governor's support more evident
or more important than in his recommendations for
LHSRSA's Division of Management. Past reorganizations
in other states have shown that if a large consolidated
department does not develop adequate management tools
for the department head, then there is little likeli-
21hood that the consolidation attempt will succeed. For
this reason, all of the commissioners of LHSRSA have sup-
ported the growth of the management division. And, as
Tables 2 and 3 indicate, Governor Edwards has also con-
sistently supported the growth of the division. While
not acceding to all of the commissioners' requests, he
has granted significant budget and personnel increases
for the division. On average, Governor Edwards has
granted 81.2% of the department's requests for appropri-
ations and 85.8% of the department's request for person-
nel .
Governor Edwards' support becomes even more signi-
ficant when measured against the record of other gover-
nors. The most publicized recent reorganization occurred
in Georgia when Jimmy Carter was governor. The most
telling criticism of the Carter reorganization is that he
failed to support management functions in the newly created
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TABLE 2
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT
(ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ONLY)*
Fiscal
Year
Agency
Requests
Governor '
s
Recommendations
1973-7^
197-4-75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78
1978- 79
$ 2,281,041
$ 2,289,065
$ 5,994,675
$17,145,729
$17,042,671
$22,556,232
$ 1,823,287
$ 2,238,249
$ 2^1490,599
$12,381,012
$15,066,190
$16,733,532
SOURCE: Louisiana, Executive Budget . Fiscal years
1973-74 through 1978-79.
*The Division of Management has periodically been a
catch-all for some programs that technically do not be-
long in a management unit. Such a program was the family
planning program. After the state took over the opera-
tion of the program from the defunct Family Health Foun-
dation, it was temporarily placed within the management
division. In the belief that figures for such programs
do not accurately reflect the governor's support for
management functions, they have been omitted from Tables
2 and 3-
TABLE 3
PERSONNEL GRANTED THE DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT
(ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ONLY)*
Fiscal
Year
Agency
Requests
Governor '
s
Recommendations
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78
114
123
354
921
862
110
123
224
703
820
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TABLE 3-Contlnued
Fiscal
Year
Agency
Request s
Governor '
s
Recommendations
1978-79 1039 865
SOURCE: Louisiana, Executive Budget
. Fiscal years
1973-7^ through 1978-79-
*See note for Table 2.
Department of Human Resources. At a 1 97 4 conference spon-
sored by the American Society for Public Administration,
James Parham (who was then deputy commissioner of the
Georgia Department of Human Resources) pointed out that
one of the major problems encountered by his department
was Governor Carter's "arbitrary presumption of econ-
omy . " Apparently in an attempt to show immediate econ-
omies resulting from his reorganization, Governor Carter
reduced administrative support personnel by one hundred
positions during the first year of the department's oper-
ation. Parham contended that it was virtually impossible
to achieve real integration of the department after Carter
made those cuts. 23 Governor Carter's actions were liter-
ally like "cutting off one's nose to spite his face."
Carter was able to show the public some instant economies,
but those economies may have jeopardized whatever real
benefits might have come from the reorganization.
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By comparison, Governor Edwards has demonstrated
that he is willing to forgo the instant economies in
favor of the slower integration process. It is not that
Edwards does not want to achieve financial savings through
reorganization. On the contrary, Edwards campaigned on
the issue of reorganization, and he promised savings
would result from his reorganization. After the health-
welfare reorganization went into effect, the governor
was able to hold a press conference to announce that re-
organization had saved the state $10 million in only six
months of operation. Yet, if one looks closely at the
data in Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that Governor Edwards
has not tried to achieve financial savings at the expense
of consolidation or of the programs operated by the de-
partment. He has, in fact, been very generous in granting
the requests of the department for additonal funds and
personnel
.
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the
1973 reorganization has altered the degree of involvement
of the governor and the commissioner of administration
in health-welfare matters. Since Huey Long's time,
Louisiana governors have been strong supporters of health
and welfare programs. As was seen, an important part of
the Longs' political appeal was their support for in-
creased expenditures for health and welfare services.
Also, the Longs frequently used appointments to health-
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welfare agencies to supplement their patronage power.
It must be concluded, then, that the health-welfare sys-
tem was accustomed to having the governor assume the
lead in the formation of health and welfare policy.
Edwards has gone beyond this. He has involved
himself, through his commissioner of administration, in
the day-to-day management affairs of the umbrella depart-
ment. What makes this so interesting is that Governor
Edwards is not really the management type. To compensate
for his lack of management ability, he has used his com-
missioner of administration as a troubleshooter for admin-
istrative problems. In some situations (such as the prob-
lems at Charity Hospital), the governor has assigned his
commissioner to "take over" certain aspects of the de-
partment's operations. Obviously this has caused some
friction since LHSRSA department officials have tended
to see this as excessive outside interference. Despite
these objections, it seems safe to conclude that LHSRSA
and its divisions can continue to expect such close scru-
tiny as long as Edwin Edwards remains the governor. The
interesting question is whether the next governor can
pay this much attention to the department unless he too
has a commissioner of administration like Charles Roemer.
One suspects that the answer will be no!
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The Legislature and the Umbrella Department
Based on past experiences, the new umbrella de-
partment's officials could have expected little involve-
ment with the legislature. In a state where the governor
has historically dominated the legislature, this is not
a difficult conclusion to reach. Louisiana legislatures
have generally followed the governor's lead. They pass
the legislation he wants, and they approve the budgets
he submits. On an individual basis, some legislators
have become very involved in specific policy areas. For
instance, it is customary for legislators to push the
interests of the state hospitals located in their dis-
tricts. Legislators have wanted to assure that their lo-
cal state hospitals receive adequate funding and that the
governor appoints "the right persons" to the hospital's
advisory board.
This situation is slowly changing as the legis-
lature attempts to assert its independence from the gover-
nor. Reflective of this trend is the creation of a legis-
lative fiscal office. In late 197^, the legislature ap-
pointed a fiscal officer to advise it on revenue and
budget matters. 2 ^ Since the fiscal officer's appointment,
he has become an important element in the legislature's
dealings with the governor and the executive branch. He
has been at odds with Governor Edwards and Commissioner
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Roemer almost since his appointment. He has disputed rev-
enue estimates submitted by the Division of Administra-
tion, he has challenged Roemer' s approval of agency def-
icit spending, and he has been very critical of what he
alleges to be the bloated budget requests of most state
agencies. While the legislature still has a long way
to go before it can accurately proclaim its independence
from the governor, the appointment of the legislative
fiscal officer constitutes a step in that direction.
It must be acknowledged that the umbrella depart-
ment represents a highly visible target. LHSRSA is the
single largest agency in state government. Its budget
for the fiscal year 1977-78 was over $900 million, and it
employed approximately 27,000 people. 2 ^ The state does
spend more on the total education budget, but that budget
? 6
is divided among several independent agencies. There-
fore, it would seem reasonable to expect that if there are
any stirrings of legislative independence, then they
would probably be apparent in the legislature's relation-
ship with LHSRSA.
Looking at this relationship over the past five
years, the pattern seems to be for the legislature to
stress the "mismanagement" in the umbrella department.
For example, the legislature criticized Dr. Mary for
Charity Hospital's practice of feeding expensive cuts of
meat to the hsopital's board members. 27 The legislature
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has also been highly critical of the state's free dental
care program. 28 That program is part of LHSRSA's Early
and Periodic Screening and Diagnostic Treatment Program.
As the name of the program implies, it tries to prevent
illness before it occurs.
The goal of the dental program is to provide free
dental care to needy children from birth to twenty-one
years of age. The program incurred a $^.7 million deficit
($3.8 million in federal funds and $836,000 in state funds)
2 9during the fiscal year 197^-75 . Legislators immedi-
ately attacked this program and the umbrella department.
They charged that some dentists were "ripping off" the
state, and they blamed LHSRSA for allowing this to happen.
The deficit was embarrassing to LHSRSA and to the Division
of Health Maintenance and Ambulatory Patient Services (the
old Department of Health) which ran the program. The
division was forced to admit publicly that it had no idea
whether dentists were actually doing all of the work they
were charging to the state. Later, the division made
matters worse by revising its estimate of how much would
be needed to cover the program's deficit. Instead of
the original $^.7 million, the division now calculated it
would need only $2.6 million (of which approximately
30
$327,000 would be required from state funds). Many
legislators, however, felt that if the division was wrong
about the first estimate, then it could also be mistaken
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about the revised estimate.
Legislative critics (including the new fiscal
officer) pointed out that the basic problem with the pro-
gram was that it was open-ended. It gave dentists au-
thority to perform any work they felt was needed. Thus,
one dentist even submitted a bill for working on thirty-
eight teeth of one child! The division could not say
whether or not any of the work was ever done.
It took several legislative appearances by the
LHSRSA commissioner and officials from the Division of
Health Maintenance and Ambulatory Patient Services, but
the legislature finally approved the deficit spending
for the program. Legislators had gotten the oppor-
tunity to question LHSRSA officials and departmental
policy. The legislative fiscal officer emphasized
that the division and LHSRSA would, in the future, have
to monitor the dental program more closely. LHSRSA
officials agreed to do this, and they came up with a
plan to have all dentists obtain permission before under-
taking any dental work on children. However, the bottom
line was that the deficit spending was approved. The
governor had wanted it, the commissioner of administra-
tion had appeared before the legislature in support of
it, and LHSRSA had wanted it.
Although this is only one instance, it seems to
reflect the type of relationship which is developing be-
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tween the legislature and LHSRSA. The legislature wil]
question, investigate, and create newspaper headlines, but
at this stage in its development, the legislature does not
appear capable of doing much more than this. Therefore,
for LHSRSA, the legislature remains a secondary consider-
ation in its political-administrative relationships.
Interest Groups, Clientele and LHSRSA
The most important interest group in health and
welfare matters has always been the medical profession
and the two medical schools in the state. The reorgan-
ization has not changed this. If one examines the 1973
reorganization closely, it is possible to see that the
dominance of the medical profession was assured from the
start. Although the legislation did not specify that
the health-welfare commissioner must be a doctor, the
first three LHSRSA commissioners have been medical doctors
More importantly, those commissioners have also been
products of the same environment - the Tulane-LSU medical
complex. Commissioner Mary had been director of Charity
Hospital before his appointment, and Commissioner William
Stewart was chancellor of LSU medical school before his
appointment. After Dr. Stewart's resignation, there was
some suggestion that a professional administrator (the
implication was that he would also be from outside the
state) should be hired to run the department. Instead,
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Dr. William Cherry, A Tulane medical school graduate with
previous experience in the U.S. Public Health Service,
was chosen to head the huge umbrella department.
The legislation creating the umbrella department
called for the appointment of a fifteen member advisory
board. It specified that at least five of the members
of the advisory board had to be medical doctors, but
it made no provision for representation by recipients of
public welfare or health services. Consequently, since
its inception, the LHSRSA advisory board has been domin-
ated by the medical profession. The first advisory
board had five medical doctors, two dentists, and one
associate professor from the Tulane medical school.
The influence of the medical profession in the
umbrella department may have had something to do with
the maintenance of the state's public hospital program.
At a time when other states are phasing out their pub-
lic hospitals, Louisiana still maintains this expensive
system. Since Tulane and LSU train their students at
Charity Hospital in New Orleans (as well as the other state
public hospitals), they have a definite stake in continu-
ing the system whatever the costs to the state. As noted
earlier, it was Tulane and LSU that pushed for the formal
affiliation agreement with Charity Hospital. And, it was
the ex-chancellor of LSU medical school, Dr. William
Stewart, who forced his Charity Hospital director to sign
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the agreement. In 1976, the LSU medical school branch
in Shreveport took over the entire operation of the
state's second largest public hospital, Confederate
Memorial Medical Center. 33 Thus, it is obvious that the
medical profession in Louisiana considers the continued
operation of public hospitals financed by the state
government to be in its own best interests. Those hos-
pitals provide the training ground for virtually all of
the state's doctors, and the state's two medical schools
(and most doctors in Louisiana are graduates of either of
these schools) have finally formalized this association
through the affiliation agreement.
What all of this indicates is that LHSRSA is
likely to find it easier to deal with the Tulane-LSU medi-
cal complex than with other professions in the department
or with other interest groups outside the medical field.
While this situation has not caused much dissension with-
in the department, there is a good possibility that it
could develop. Frederick Mosher, in his book Democrac y
and the Public Service
,
speculates that:
...the most explosive situations in professionalized
public agencies arise between those in different pro-
fessions (or segments) and in different personnel
systems who are approximately equal in level of re-
sponsibility and pay, but where one is "more elite"
than the other . 3^
Each profession brings to the organization its own par-
ticular view of the world and the agency's role in it.
When those professions are combined together under one
department, the result can be dissension over policy or
over relations" with clients.
A close examination of the relations between
LHSRSA and its clients reveals the tensions that exist be-
cause of the dominance of the medical profession in the
department. The legislation creating LHSRSA did not speci-
fy any official role for clientele of the department.
There was no provision that a certain number of the advis-
ory board members be recipients of public assistance or
users of the other services offered by the department.
This should not be surprising in view of the fact that
it was the medical profession which was most influential
in drawing up the consolidation plan. The traditional
doctor-patient relationship is one where the doctor is
assumed to know the best treatment to provide the patient.
The patient is expected to follow this treatment or seek
the services of another doctor.
The problem for LHSRSA and its doctor/commission-
ers is that the traditional doctor-patient relationship
is precisely what the department does not need. Clients
of public assistance and health services have become more
demanding. They want more services, better services,
and more convenient delivery of those services. They also
are demanding a greater role in decision-making for the
department. They want representation on all departmental
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advisory boards, and they expect their opinions to be con-
sidered. When their views do not receive prompt response
from departmental officials, the clients can be expected
to take more drastic action. This happened when parents
of retarded and emotionally disturbed children did not
receive what they perceived to be fair treatment by the
health-welfare department and the state of Louisiana.
Those parents brought suit in federal court in order to
force the state to remove Louisiana children from sub-
standard Texas institutions. The court eventually sided
with the parents and ordered the state to bring those
children back to Louisiana (where they were to be placed
in licensed facilities). Under court order, the state
3 6drew up a plan and began implementing it in 1976.
In the final analysis, although the department is
classified as a health and human resources agency, it tends
to emphasize the "health" aspect more than any other.
Welfare recipients do not have ready access to the commis-
sioner's office. Moreover, this situation can be ex-
pected to continue as long as the medical profession dom-
inates the department. The future may also bring more
client/department conflicts. The likelihood is that, as
Mosher predicts, conflicts will also arise among the dif-
ferent professions within the department. In that event,
it should be interesting to see whether the medical pro-
fession is able to retain control over the department.
Conclusions
The findings of this chapter show that there have
been some changes in the political-administrative rela-
tionships. However, it is interesting to note that most
of these changes appear to be the consequences of other
factors in the political environment.
Two of the changes have occurred in the relation-
ships between the consolidated department and the legis-
lature and clientele groups. Since the consolidated de-
partment was created, the state legislature has estab-
lished the position of legislative fiscal officer. His
function is to advise the legislature on fiscal and pol-
icy matters. Although the position is still developing,
it is already possible to see a greater tendency for the
legislature to question bureaucratic actions. Another
change has come about in the views of the health-welfare
clients. They are growing in their insistency and in
their vocal demands on state government. One example
which illustrates this is the federal suit initiated by
the parents of exceptional children. This ability of
clients to get redress from outside sources (principally
in the courts) has meant a changed relationship between
the umbrella department and its clientele. Clients are
no longer content to be passive recipients of the depart-
ment's services. They now want an active role in deter-
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mining the policy that affects them.
However, the most visible of the changes has been
in the management style of the governor. It has been the
custom since Huey Long's time for Louisiana governors to
be actively concerned with health and welfare policy.
Edwin Edwards has gone beyond this. Even though he took
office with no prior administrative experience, Edwards
has developed a very effective management style. What
the governor has done is to broaden the role of the com-
missioner of administration, giving him almost carte
blanche authority to interfere in any administrative mat-
ter he deems necessary. Since his appointment to the
position, Charles Roemer has used his authority extensive-
ly. Sometimes he has interfered at the specific request
of the governor, but, quite often, he has done so on his
own initiative.
With respect to the umbrella department, both the
governor and the commissioner of administration have found
it necessary to involve themselves in the department's prob-
lems. As this study has shown, the new department has ex-
perienced numerous problems organizing and operating the
programs under its control. To the extent that reorgan-
ization has brought about these problems, one might then
conclude that it is the reorganization that has caused
the greater degree of involvement from the governor and
the commissioner of administration. Given the political
stake Governor Edwards has in achieving a successful re-
organization, it is understandable that he may have felt
compelled to devote more of his time to the problems
encountered by the health-welfare department.
In the final analysis, it must be said that re-
organization was not quite the trauma that some people
expected. The Louisiana reorganization case demonstrates
that the nature of a state's political-administrative
environment is constantly changing. Ironically, there
probably would have been changes in political and admin-
istrative relationships even if there had been no reor-
ganization in 1973- The changing political environment
in Louisiana would have forced the separate health and
welfare agencies to alter their relationships with other
political actors in the state.
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Two of the most important supporters of the reorgan-
ization were Dr. Charles Mary, who was then the head
of the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, and Dr. Ransom
K. Vidrine, the State Health Officer.
New Orleans Times-Picayune
,
27 March 1976, sec. 1,
p. 5; and 24 June 1976, sec. 1, p. 24. Also see
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
, 27 March 1976, sec. B,
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CHAPTER V
THE EFFECTS OF THE 1973 REORGANIZATION ON THE
OUTPUTS OF THE HEALTH-WELFARE SYSTEM
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the sub-
stantive effectiveness of the 1973 Louisiana reorganization
on state policy in the health-welfare area. According to
Frederick Mosher, this involves judging a reorganization
against the goals it was intended to accomplish. 1 Thus,
if a reorganization was supposed to achieve financial
savings for state government, then it would be judged by
how much savings had actually resulted. Or, if the reor-
ganization was supposed to improve services, then it would
be judged by the type and the quality of the services it
now offers to its clients. In the case of the 1973 Loui-
siana reorganization, any assessment of its impact would
have to begin by focusing on these two goals since these
were the most frequently mentioned goals during the re-
organization debate.
The Effect of Reorganization on Total Spending
Looking first at the claim for huge economies, it
is impossible to see where these have actually resulted.
177
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As Table 4 shows, the budget for health-welfare has in-
creased from $520.5 million in fiscal 1972-73 to $910
million in fiscal 1977-78. That represents a 7^.7% in-
crease during the first five years of the department's
existence. Even after accounting for the effects of in-
flation, there is still a 17.65? increase in the depart-
ment's budget (see Table 5). During that same period, the
number of employees in the health-welfare department in-
creased from 17,357 to 26,887 (a 54.9% increase). 2
One possible area of savings for the state could
be in federal funding. During the reorganization debate,
the supporters of the reorganization suggested that a con-
solidated department would be able to attract additional
federal funding. This, they said, would then free state
revenues for other areas or would even permit a reduction
in state taxes. But, here too the consolidation has not
lived up to its expectations. Table 6 shows that total
federal funds expressed as a percentage of LHSRSA's
budget have decreased from 48.1* to 45.6% for the period
from 1972-73 to 1977-78. Even using figures adjusted for
inflation, there has still been a decrease in federal
funds. From 1972-73 to 1977-78, federal funds as a per-
centage of total LHSRSA expenditures have decreased from
48.1% to 46.7% (see Table 7).
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TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE
EXPENDITURES AS PERCENT OF
TOTAL LHSRSA BUDGET
Fiscal State Federal
Year Funds Funds
1972- 73*
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78
51.95s
56.2%
58.8%
58.2%
52.7%
54.4%
48.1%
43.8%
41.2%
41.8%
47.3%
45.6%
Source: Louisiana. Executive Budget
1972-73 through 1977-78.
*See note for Tables 4 and 5.
Fiscal years
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING TO LHSRSA
AFTER ADJUSTING FOR INFLATION
Fiscal
Year
State
Funds
Federal
Funds
1972- 73*
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78
51.9%
55.7%
58.5%
57.5%
51.9%
53-3%
48.1%
44
.
3%
41.5
42.3%
48.1%
46.7%
Source: Louisiana. Executive Budget
1972-73 through 1977-78.
Fiscal years
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Economic
Indicators
,
by the Council of Economic Advisers.
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TABLE 7- Continued
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January,
1 97 9 •
*See note for Tables H and 5.
While consolidation has not brought about the ex-
pected increases in federal funding, it is not possible
to blame the loss of federal funding on the consolidation.
On the contrary, the 1973 Louisiana reorganization came
at a time when federal funds for categorical programs
were declining. The percentage decrease in federal funds
for Louisiana is probably a reflection of this phenomenon
rather than the effect of the recent consolidation .
^
Based on the available data, one must conclude
that reorganization has not brought about huge savings
either in terms of reduction of the total budget or in
terms of additional federal funds which free state revenues
for other program areas. Thus, once again it has been
demonstrated that the savings claim for reorganization
is not attainable unless state officials are willing to
cut established programs. Since these are the programs
that usually have the strongest support from clientele,
interest groups, and agency employees, those program cuts
are rarely made.
Louisiana is no exception. Throughout this study,
it has been emphasized that there exists strong support
among many groups for the continuation of health and welfare
183
programs. This pressure appears intense enough to assure
continued expansion of the health-welfare budget even
while the governor and the legislature are worrying about
the decline in the state's severance tax revenues (the
biggest revenue source for the state of Louisiana).
Governor Edwards must have recognized this fact at an
early point because he has always tempered his predic-
tion of economies with the promise that services would
not be cut. Also, despite the recent efforts of the
legislature to use the umbrella department in its fight
to gain independence from the governor, the legislature
has not made any drastic cuts in the department's budget.
It continues to threaten such cuts, but, so far, these
threats have not been carried out.
The Effect of Reorganization on
Established Programs
As Table 8 indicates, certain program areas seem to
have benefited greatly from the reorganization. The Divi-
sion of Management's budget has increased from $3,922,258
in 1972-73 to $18,361,876 in 1977-78 (an increase of 36-8%)
.
However, these figures do not reflect only administrative
services. When only administrative services are consid-
ered, the increase is from $1,598,711 to $18,361,876.
That represents a 10W increase. After adjusting for the
effects of inflation, the increase is 6^1%, still a very
184
TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF BUDGET TOTALS
FOR DIVISIONS OF LHSRSA
Divisions 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75
Hosps . a $ ^47,^1^,546 $ 59,907,162 $ 61,458,008
CHNOb $ 46,896,858 $ 50,175,075 $ 57,471,919
MH C $ 37,065,173 $ 40,995,266 $ 48,715,438
MR d $ 25,045,966 $ 36,521,860 $ 43,565,420
HS e $ 1,871,144 $ 3,837,475 $ 3,632,171
HM&APS f $ 18,690,153 $ 21,986,204 $ 31,135,806
IMS $339,679,707 $322,871,002 $313,872,221
Admin
.
h
$ 3,922,258 $ 11,148,104 $ 20,679,368
YS 1 $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
hr j
'
$ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
Rehab. k $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
Source Louisiana
.
Executive Budget Fiscal years
1972-73 through 1977-78.
Notes
:
aAbbreviat ion for Division of Hospitals. This
total includes all functions for the division.
Abbreviation for Charity Hospital at New Orleans. This
division increased its budget 81.4% from 1972-73 to 1977-78.
Abbreviation for the Division of Mental Health. It
increased its budget 56.6%.
Abbreviation for the Division of Mental Retardation.
It increased its budget 108.9$.
Abbreviation for the Division of Human Services. It
experienced a 502% budget increase.
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TABLE 8 - Continued
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
$ 70,477,466 $ 61,368,760 $ 69,018,580
$ 69,429,145 $ 76,069,863 $ 85,067,675
$ 49,247,698 $ 54,162,584 $ 58,059,265
$ 56,868,096 $ 44,117,750 $ 52,178,176
$ 5,401,332 $ 7,952,798 $ 11,263,556
$ 33,860,489 $ 51,351,392 $ 51,802,825
$413,760,652 $477,847,346 $508,856,569
$ 27,003,421 $ 15,618,167 $ 18,361,876
$ 9,707,282 $ 11,035,313 $ 6,339,170
$ -0- $ 479,408 $ 545,060
$ -0- $ 45,967,133 $ 48,442,792
1 Abbreviation for Division of Health Maintenance and
Ambulatory Patient Services (later changed to the Divi-
sion of Health). Its budget increased 177.2%.
&Abbreviat ion for the Division of Income Maintenance
(later changed to the Division of Family Services). Its
budget increased 49.8$.
Abbreviation for the Division of Management.
Abbreviation for the Division of Youth Services.
Abbreviation for the Division of Human Relations.
Abbreviation for the Division of Rehabilitation
Services
.
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significant increase for that division (see Table 9 for
the inflation adjusted figures for all of the department's
divisions). There does not appear to be any other explan-
ation for this large increase except that reorganization
has affected the division's budget. Given the nature of
the division's work and its role in helping to integrate
the various units of the department, one must conclude
that the consolidation was primarily responsible for the
increase in its budget.
Another division which has experienced a dramatic
increase in its budget is Charity Hospital at New Orleans.
Although not as dramatic as the increase for the Division
of Management, Charity Hospital's increase is still signi-
ficant. Table 8 shows an Ql.H% increase for Charity Hospi-
tal, or a 17% increase in inflation adjusted dollars.
The full impact of this increase cannot be realized un-
til it is compared with the increase for the remainder
of the state's general care public hospitals. For the
same period, the percentage increase for the Division
of Hospitals is only 45.6$; however, after adjusting for
inflation, the figure is -6.1%, an actual decrease in
the budget for the Division of Hospitals. In this par-
ticular case, there appears to be little doubt but that
the reorganization is partly responsible for this signi-
ficant difference in the budgets of these two divisions.
Veteran political observers in Louisiana have
187
TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF BUDGET TOTALS FOR LHSRSA DIVISIONS
US.ING INFLATION ADJUSTED FIGURES
Divisions 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75
Hosps . * $ 47,414,546 $ 53,015,188 $ 49,562,910
CHNO $ 46,896,858 $ 44 ,402,721 $ 46,348,322
MH $ 37,065,173 $ 36,278,996 $ 39,286,644
MR $ 25,045,966 $ 32,320,230 $ 35,133,403
HS $ 1,871,144 $ 3,395,996 $ 2,929,170
HM&APS $ 18,690,153 $ 19,456,818 $ 25,109,521
IM $339,679,707 $285,726,550 $253,122,759
Admin
.
$ 3,922,258 $ 9,865,579 $ 16,676,910
YS $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
HR $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
Rehab $ -0- $ -0- $ -0-
Source: Louisiana. Executive Budget . Fiscal years
1972-73 through 1977-78.
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Economic
Indicators
,
by the Council of Economic Advisers.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January,
1979.
*For key to abbreviations, see the notes for Table 8.
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TABLE 9 - Continued
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
$ 52,595,124 $ 42,617,194 $ 44
,
528 ,116
$ 51,812,795 $ 52,826,294 $ 54,882,371
$ 36,752,013 $ 37,612,906 $ 37,457,590
$ 42,^38,878 $ 30,637,326 $ 33,663,339
$ 4 ,030,845 $ 5,522,776 $ 7,266,810
$ 25,269,022 $ 35,660,689 $ 33,421,177
$308,776,606 $331,838,435 $328,294,561
$ 20,151,807 $ 10,845,949 $ 11,846,372
$ 7 , 244 ,240 $ 7,663,412 $ 4,089,787
$ -0- $ 332,923 $ 351,652
$ -0- $ 31,921,620 $ 31,253,414
long noted that Charity Hospital in New Orleans was
treated like the state's stepchild when it came to appro-
priations. LHSRSA's first commissioner, Dr. Charles Mary,
had been director of Charity Hospital prior to his appoint-
ment to the commissioner's post. He often noted that as
Charity's director he had experienced frustration in
getting the state to fund the hospital. When Charity
briefly lost its accreditation in 1975, the reason most
often cited was the long years of neglect by the state
government
.
Why was Charity Hospital neglected for so long?
The answer seems to be that Charity Hospital was too
completely identified as a New Orleans institution. It
was governed by its own board, and the State Department
of Hospitals had no formal control over it. In past
years, there has been a pronounced bias on the part of
non-New Orleans legislators towards anything that might
benefit the city. Since Charity primarily served the
city's large black population, rural white legislators
found even less reason to support its budget requests.
With the reorganization, however, Charity Hospital
was brought under the control of the new umbrella depart-
ment. No longer was its governing body located in New
Orleans. Its problems now became part of the problems
confronting the new department. Thus, the reorganization
gave non-New Orleans legislators less reason to deny the
hospital's budget requests. An additional factor account-
ing for the large increase can be attributed to the chang-
ing attitudes of state legislators. Because they now
have large black constituencies in their own districts,
they are much more inclined to vote increases for Charity
Hospital. Some of their rural black constituents may
end up receiving medical care at Charity. Thus, rural
legislators now have a stake in seeing that Charity's
services are maintained and improved. This may become
190
even more significant given the gradual phasing out of
some of the smaller rural hospitals in the state.
With respect to the budget increases for other
divisions, it is not clear whether these are the result
of the reorganization. It seems likely that other factors
are primarily responsible for some of the increases. For
instance, the 108$ increase for the Division of Mental
Retardation (35.3% after adjusting for the effects of in-
flation) probably reflects the pressure that has been ap-
plied to state government since 197^ • Operators of pri-
vate residential treatment centers for the mentally re-
tarded and emotionally disturbed children, parents' groups,
and the media have pressured the state government to in-
crease its capabilities for housing the state's emotion-
ally disturbed and mentally retarded children. As noted,
the state had been sending these children to out-of-state
private institutions (mostly in Texas) and paying very
high costs for their upkeep.^ After revelations showing
that many of these institutions provided substandard care,
parents forced the state to bring these children back to
Louisiana. In order for the state to do this, it was
first necessary to upgrade many of the state's residential
treatment facilities already in operation. This accounts
for some of the large increases in the Division of Mental
Retardation's budget. It also accounts for the creation
of one of the state's newest divisions - Rehabilitation
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Services. The latter division was established in 1976
and is responsible for providing services to the mentally
and physically handicapped. Included among the programs
the division operates is the "Exceptional Children's Act."
The purpose of this program is to provide financial assist-
ance to the families of exceptional children for the cost
of boarding and/or therapy in a private residential treat-
ment facility when a state facility is not available.
In 1977, over 2,000 children received services under the
act. 6
Two other divisions which have experienced great
budget increases are the divisions of Health and Human
Services. The Division of Health had a 177% increase
(79% after adjusting for inflation), and the Division of
Human Services had a 502% increase (288% after adjusting
for inflation). However, in both cases the budget increases
appear to be related to factors other than the recent re-
organization. The most likely factor is the increase in
the social services provided by the divisions. The Divi-
sion of Human Services provides services primarily to the
aged population of the state. Its services include adult
day-care, homemaker services, and "meals on wheels."
The Division of Health has expanded its social services
in the area of family planning. After the state took over
the family planning program from the defunct Family Health
Foundation, the program was given to the Division of Health
192
to administer. Some of the division's budget increases
can be accounted for by this program's addition. More-
over, the health division has also expanded its medical
services, including the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis
and Treatment Program.
Policy Changes Since Reorganization
A careful analysis of Tables 8 and 9 plus other
data show that there has been a subtle shift in policy
emphasis in the umbrella department. As indicated in
previous chapters, the department has always had a bias
in favor of providing hospital services. ^ This is in
large measure due to the orientation of the three suc-
cessive commissioners as well as to the well-established
nature of the state's public hospital system. With re-
spect to the latter, Louisiana's persistence in such a
policy goes counter to the trend in other parts of the
country. In recent years, state and local governments
have experienced decreasing bed occupancy rates in their
public hospitals. Since the outset of the federal govern-
ment's medical assistance program, patients have chosen
to enter private facilities rather than state operated
hospitals. Part of the reason for this may lie in the
fact that in state operated hospitals, patients are not
allowed to choose their own physicians. However, under
the federal medical assistance program, the patient has
193
that choice.
Louisiana has also experienced this decline in
patient population in its public hospitals. The average
daily occupancy rate for all state general care public
hospitals (excluding Charity Hospital in New Orleans)
was 59.7% in fiscal 1964-65. Charity Hospital's occupan-
o
cy rate for the same period was 76.2%. When these figures
are added to the rising cost of medical care in the state
hospitals, the picture is not promising. Data show that
state hospital costs have risen from $23.89 (average cost
qper unit of service) in 1964-65 to $83.79 in 1973-74.
That represents a 250% increase in ten years.
The problem in Louisiana is that the state's public
hospital system is well-entrenched politically. The sys-
tem is part of the legacy of Longism, and it is no accident
that two of the hospitals bear the Long name in their
title. With these political pressures and the orientation
of the LHSRSA commissioners, change has come slowly to
Louisiana. Yet, changes are apparent.
In fiscal 1957-58, the average daily patient popu-
lation was 3,192, and the number of beds in use was 46l6
(the occupancy rate was 69. 2%).
10
As Table 10 shows,
the bed capacity of the state's public hospital system
had dropped to 2666 by 1976. The cost of these beds was
$122.44. Table 11 gives the figures for all of the state
hospitals except Charity Hospital. Significantly, it
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TABLE 10
TRENDS IN OCCUPANCY FOR THE
.
STATE GENERAL HOSPITALS
Year
Average
Daily
Patients
Bed
Capac-
ity
%
Occu-
pancy
Average
Cost Per
Unit
70.8 $ n .a.
68.3 $ 67.60
69.8 $ 714.18
70.3 $ 77.17
68.4 $ 62.61
69.5 $108.21
63.6 $122.40
65.3 $130.32
62.2 $139.97
Source: Louisiana. Executive Budget. Fiscal years
1972-73 through 1978-79.
aEstimated figures for 1977.
Figures included in the governor's budget recommenda-
tions for fiscal year 1978-79.
TABLE 11
TRENDS IN OCCUPANCY FOR THE
STATE GENERAL HOSPITALS
(EXCLUDING CHARITY HOSPITAL)
Average Bed /o
Year Daily' Capac- Occu-
Patients ity pancy
1970 669 1,105 60. 5
1971 894 1,423 62.8
1972 927 1,455 63.7
1973 1,057 1,741 60.7
1974 1,031 1,745 59-1
1975 689 1,185 58.1
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977?
1978 b
2,021
2,224
2,210
2,364
2,318
1,812
1,696
1,747
1,758
2,853
3,255
3,165
3,361
3,387
2,608
2,666
2,674
2,827
1"',
'ABLK J 1 - Continued
Year
Average
Da i ] y
Patients
Bed
Capac-
ity
%
Occu-
pancy
1976
1977a
1978^
67^
705
738
1 ,166
1,174
1,327
57.8
60.1
55.6
Source: Louisiana. Executive Budget . Fiscal
years 1972-73 through 1978-79.
aEstimated figures for 1977.
^Figures included in the governor's budget recommenda-
tions for fiscal year 1978-79-
shows expected occupancy for 1978-79 at 55.6%. Thus, these
figures confirm that the state's public hospital system is
still losing patients. These figures also seem to suggest
that the system may bo "winding down" gradually. The recent
increases in the budget for Charity Hospital may in fact
reflect this trend. As the smaller state hospitals are
being phased out, the largest ones will be improved. This
improvement obviously does not include much expansion of
bed capacity. Rather, it seems to be directed at improving
the existing services offered by the hospitals. For in-
stance, Charity Hospital has recently expanded its sat-
ellite clinic program. The concept of this program is
to
locate clinics on a city-wide basis so that patients
do
not have to come into center city to receive
free medical
196
services. The satellite clinics are equipped to handle
most minor medical services, but major services continue
to be provided at Charity Hospital.
It should be noted that as the state phases out
its hospital services, it has been increasing its services
in the area of preventive care. An example of this is
the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment
Program offered by the Division of Health.
With respect to the effect of the reorganization
on the outputs in the public assistance program, the pic-
ture is very confusing. In 197^, the Supplemental Secur-
ity Income Program (SSI) went into effect across the
country.-'"-'- The new program provides for federal takeover
of three categorical assistance programs: Old Age Assist-
ance (OAA), Aid to the Needy Blind (ANB), and Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD). Under the new
program, the federal government administers these three
categories of assistance, and it also establishes national
12
eligibility standards.
With the elimination of OAA, ANB, and APTD, the
state now administers only two categorical assistance pro-
grams: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
General Assistance (GA). One might expect that this de-
velopment would see a decrease in the budget for the Di-
vision of Family Services (which administers the state's
welfare program), and this, in fact, has happened if one
considers the figures adjusted for the effects of infla-
tion. The actual percentage decrease for the Division of
Family Services is -3.4%.
What has happened to the division's budget is that
the amount budgeted for public assistance has decreased
because of the SSI program. However, the amount budgeted
for administrative services in the division has shown an
1
3
increase. J An examination of this increase reveals it
to be in the social services now provided by the division.
One of the fastest growing areas is the adult social serv-
ices programs. In 1974, adult social services were funded
at $4.1 million in state and federal funds. Approxi-
mately ^32 employees (including both clerical and profes-
sional workers) staffed the individual programs. It is
interesting to note that there is considerable overlap be-
tween these social services and those offered by the Di-
vision of Human Services. Both divisions now have exten-
sive social services for the elderly. Their programs in-
clude: home delivered meals, day-care centers and home-
maker services. So far, there has been no attempt by the
LHSRSA commissioner to eliminate this program duplication.
In fact, the presence of the overlap is itself still more
evidence of the continuing lack of integration in the
department. If the commissioner really had complete con-
trol over his department, he would not have allowed these
duplicating programs to develop.
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ConcI usions
In the final analysis, the 1973 health-welfare
reorganization did not produce the financial savings pre-
dicted by its supporters. Data show that the budget for
the health-welfare umbrella department has increased each
year since the reorganization went into effect. The num-
ber of personnel employed by the department has also in-
creased .
Contrary to the expectations of the proponents
of the reorganization, there has been no great increase
in federal funds allocated to the department. This does
not necessarily indicate that the consolidation arrange-
ment is not an appropriate organizational structure for
attracting federal funds. It only reflects the fact that
categorical programs have decreased since 1973 when the
Louisiana reorganization went into effect. Thus, there
are not as many federal programs for which the new depart-
ment can apply.
As the data indicate, there have been several sig-
nificant budget increases within the department. While
it is not possible to say with certainty how much of these
increases is due to the reorganization, there is some
reason to believe that the increases for Charity Hospi-
tal and the Division of Management are related to the
reorganization. The latter unit has been used by LHSRSA
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commissioners in their effort to gain control over this
large department. The consolidation of Charity Hospita]
under LHSRSA's umbrella seems to have removed from it the
stigma of being "a New Orleans institution." Although
there may be other factors relative to the increases for
Charity, it seems apparent that some of the increase is
a result of the new organizational arrangement.
It also appears that there has been a slight
policy shift since the reorganization went into effect.
Although the medical profession still seems firmly in
control of the department, there has been a shift away
from public hospital care. To a large extent, this simply
reflects national trends in hospital services. However,
since all of the state's public hospitals are now under
one department, the state is in a much better position
to coordinate the remaining hospital services offered by
the department.
This chapter has also noted that there has been
a steady decrease in the number of beds and the occupancy
rate at most state operated public hospitals. Yet, the
number of beds and the occupancy rate for Charity Hospital
have remained somewhat stable. Charity Hospital's future
seems assured because of its size, but another factor as-
suring Charity's continued existence is its role in the
training of the state's doctors. The affiliation agree-
ment between Charity Hospital and the two medical
schools
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seems to guarantee the continued existence of Charity even
as the state closes other hospitals.
The other significant policy trend can be seen in
the area of social services. Currently, several divisions
of the umbrella department are involved in the provision
of social services. These divisions include: Health,
Family Services, Human Services and Rehabilitation Serv-
ices. There is some overlap among these social services
programs, and the prospect for the future may include
serious management problems in this area as the overlapping
and duplication grow worse.
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"CHAPTER VI
WHAT DID REORGANIZATION IN LOUISIANA
ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISH?
Like so many other state reorganizations, the
Louisiana reorganization did not fulfill the great prom-
ises of its supporters. It did not result in huge fi-
nancial savings for the state. On the contrary, as this
chapter has shown, the state's health and welfare programs
are costing the taxpayers more today than before the re-
organization went into effect. Furthermore, reorganiza-
tion has not helped the state accumulate larger amounts
of federal aid funds. It had been speculated during the
reorganization debate that a consolidated department would
be in a better position to attract federal funds. Pro-
ponents of the reorganization argued that consolidation
would provide a better utilization of available state
funds to attract federal money. What had not been antici-
pated was that the federal government would greatly cut
back on the number of its categorical grant programs.
Thus, no matter what organizational arrangement the state
had devised, there would still be fewer federal grants
available in the health-welfare area.
With respect to the degree of integration achieved
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by reorganization, the results are also less than were
expected. Traditional reorganization literature suggests
that reorganization will produce a department in which
the basic operating units are totally integrated into the
whole. One factor in achieving this objective is adequate
management tools for the department head. Without these
tools, the department head would be hard pressed to co-
ordinate the activities of the units placed under his
control. As already noted in this study, the commissioner
of the Louisiana umbrella department has developed many
of these management tools. Through the efforts of the
second commissioner, Dr. William Stewart, the Division
of Management has become an important force assisting
the commissioner in trying to control his department.
Despite these advances in management functions,
the job of integrating fully the programs and functions
of the department remains unfinished. One of the more
successful actions of the commissioner has been in the
area of public hospitals. Under the 1973 reorganization,
the Department of Hospitals and the huge Charity Hospital
complex in New Orleans were combined under one depart-
ment. In retrospect, this consolidation had important
policy implications for the state. The national trend
has been for public hospitals to be gradually phased out
of operation, but Louisiana was committed to maintaining
an expensive state operated system that was financed al-
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most totally with state money. Since the 1973 reorgan-
ization went into effect, some policy changes have been
evident. The smaller rural hospitals are' slowly being
phased out, and Charity Hospital has undergone a major
overhaul in its buildings, its management, and its
services. These changes were certainly long overdue.
The state had allowed the huge hospital to deteriorate
to the point where its accreditation was in jeopardy.
The consolidation arrangement seemed to facilitate the
state's coming to grips with the problems in its hospital
system. Reorganization lessened the identity of Charity
as a New Orleans institution and also eased the closing
of hospital beds at smaller rural hospitals.
The role of the first three commissioners of the
umbrella department in this policy change has been pivotal.
Each of the commissioners has been a product of the Tulane-
LSU medical complex. Given this background, it is not
surprising that they have concentrated a good deal of their
efforts on the problems of the hospital system. Their
backgrounds probably also account for the relative ease
with which the state's medical profession has accepted
these changes.
One area where there has been much less success
in integrating programs and policies is in the social
services. Most of the increases in the social services
programs have come only since 1973- Because of the new-
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ness of the program area, one might have expected the um-
brella department to achieve a more coordinated social
services system. It has not done so, however. Social
services programs are duplicated among several different
divisions within the umbrella department.
This situation may be the result of the preoccupa-
tion of the department's commissioners with health prob-
lems. It may also be the result of the commissioners'
medical backgrounds. One certainly has to wonder what
would have happened if any or all of the department's
commissioners had been professional administrators.
Would that have made a difference? Would there have been
better integration of the social services? Would a pro-
fessional administrator have been better able to handle
the numerous management problems that have arisen since
1973? Would a professional administrator have become em-
broiled in a public dispute with the governor?
On the other hand, one must also wonder whether
the Tulane-LSU medical interests and the medical profes-
sion would have been as cooperative with the umbrella de-
partment if a professional administrator had been chosen
to run the department. Would they have fought to exempt
Charity and the other state hospitals from the reorgan-
ization?
Finally, there is the nagging question whether a
large consolidation was actually warranted. Granted
the
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agencies consolidated in 1973 were in the general area of
health and welfare, but is that adequate justification
for their inclusion under one giant umbrella department?
Is it possible that a department as large as the Louisiana
health-welfare department is really too large for one per-
son to control? Is it possible that full integration of
the department's programs will always remain an unachieve-
able goal?
The failure of the 1973 reorganization to live
up to its high expectations illustrates the problem facing
the state reorganization movement. That problem is that
state reorganizations do not achieve all their proponents
predict for them. Reorganization has not made state govern-
ment more manageable; nor has reorganization improved
state services. And, in spite of the predictions, state
reorganization does not save money. In fact, just the
opposite is true! Studies have shown that government ex-
penditures actually increase after the adoption of a re-
organization .
So who benefits from reorganization? Certainly
the politicians who use reorganization as part of their
election campaigns do benefit in the short run. But,
who else benefits? Does it really make any difference
whether reorganization occurs or not?
The answer to the last question is: Yes, reorgan-
ization does make a difference. Even though the Louisiana
208
reorganization fell short of its goals, one must acknowledge
that there have been some benefits from it. One of those
benefits has been in giving the state some needed reorgan-
ization experienced. As previously noted in this study,
Louisiana's experience with administrative reorganization
was limited and politically controversial. Thus, the
1973 reorganization gave the state a working knowledge
of the problems encountered in restructuring the admin-
istrative system. This was especially useful after the
new state constitution (197*0 mandated reorganization
of the entire state government. Rather than adopt a re-
organization plan immediately, the state proceeded very
cautiously. If the 1973 reorganization had taught any-
thing, it was that implementation of a reorganization
plan is just as important as formulating it.
In order to ensure the full implementation of the
mandated reorganization plan, the legislature established
a special reorganization committee. The latter was em-
powered to formulate a reorganization which would carry
out the constitutional mandate. More importantly, the
committee also had the power to monitor the implementation
of the plan to ensure that economies would result. Using
that authority, the reorganization committee held many
meetings with the secretary-designates of the new depart-
ments. The secretaries were instructed to come in with
plans for achieving budget and personnel cuts. Those
who
failed to do so were informed that if they did not come
up with better plans, the committee itself would draw up
an implementation plan and submit it to the legislature
for its approval. In most cases, the secretaries got the
message and came into committee meetings with acceptable
plans for achieving economies.
The 1973 reorganization plan also served as a
catalyst for reevaluating health-welfare policy. Pre-
viously, health and welfare policy were principally the
domain of the professional groups involved in providing
the services, the governor, and some interested legisla-
tors. Once Governor Edwards proposed his plan, this
placed health-welfare policy on the public agenda. Other
interest groups, legislators, the news media, and recipi-
ents of services became involved in voicing their opinions
about the adequacy or inadequacy of the state's health
and welfare services. Thus, one byproduct of a reorgan-
ization may be its ability to shake things up - to cause
more public discussion and perhaps even to stimulate poli-
cy change.
The prospect that reorganization can stimulate
policy change is important to the governor. The litera-
ture on the modern state governor suggests that the gover-
nor is often placed in the position of responding to bu-
reaucratic actions. However, proposing a reorganization
offers him the opportunity to set the agenda. Whether
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policy changes the governor wants are ever achieved may
not, in the final analysis, be as important to him as the
fact that the state bureaucracy was forced to respond to
one of his initiatives.
For Governor Edwards, the 1973 reorganization
held some special benefits. During the 1971-72 governor's
race, he had campaigned on a platform to reform the state
government. Once in office, Edwards was able to fulfill
that promise. He achieved both reorganization and the
adoption of a new state constitution, and in achieving
these, he also succeeded in building a record on which
he could run for reelection. In addition, Edwards' cham-
pioning of reorganization had important political benefits
among certain segments of the state's population. For
the disadvantaged, Edwards' support of more health and
welfare services symbolized his commitment to the welfare
of the state's needy. The fact that Edwards also chose
to appoint so many blacks to important positions in the
new department was also significant. It symbolized the
governor's commitment to greater black participation in
state government. From a practical standpoint, the ap-
pointment of so many blacks to these key positions cemented
the governor's support in the black community. That could
have been very important to the governor in his reelection
bid. Finally, for the middle class taxpayers, the gover-
nor's reorganization proposal symbolized his concern with
the rising costs of government services. Even though
Governor Edwards, never achieved those savings, he derived
some political benefit from his effort.
To summarize, reorganization has had important
consequences for Louisiana. It has given the governor
additional leverage in dealing with the state bureaucracy.
It has allowed a reassessment of health-welfare policy,
and it has permitted this reassessment to take place in
full public view. This has allowed greater participation
from all segments of the state's population in the making
of state health and welfare policy. Reorganization has
also had significant symbolic effect on those segments
of the population seeking more services and lower taxes.
Thus, in the final analysis, the truth of the Louisiana
reorganization seems to lie somewhere between the ideal-
istic model postulated by the reformers and the cynical
appraisal of the political skeptics. The 1973 health-
welfare reorganization did matter: to the governor, to
the legislature, to interest groups, to clientele, and
to the general public. No one who has observed Louisiana
politics during the Edwards' administration could dispute
this. And, because reorganization has mattered to some
political actors, the likelihood is that the state will,
in the future, reorganize again.
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